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ABSTRACT
The paper provi des new  i nsi ght s int o t he rol e of fi nanci al li berali zati on i n t he Sout h 
Ko r ean fi nanci al cri sis using a num ber of novel  approaches. Fi r stl y,  pri ma r y
i nforma t i on  r egardi ng  t he  r elaxati on  of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s,  such as i nt erest  r ate ceil i ngs,  
capit al  cont r ol s and r eserve r equi r em ents,  i s coll ected and sum m ari sed.    Secondl y,   t hi s 
i nforma t i on i s used t o const r uct   s u mma r y m easures of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.     Thi r dl y,  
qual i t ati ve i nforma t i on on t he rol e of fi nanci al li berali zati on i n t he fi nanci al cri sis is
presented fr om  a new  survey of 44 IMF ,  Wo r l d Bank and K orean off i cials w ho had 
di r ect exposure to t he events surr oundi ng t he fi nanci al cri sis.  Fourt hl y,  the eff ects of 
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on on t he evol ut i on of banki ng and fi nanci al ri sks are esti ma t ed
ut i l i sing a condi t i onal  CAPM  wi t h t i me - v a r yi ng m arket  ri sk.  Final l y,  qual i t ati ve and 
quant i t ati ve  f i ndi ngs  are j uxt aposed,   all ow i ng  i nsi ght s i nt o  t he  extent  t o  wh i ch f i nanci al 
ma r ket s recogni zed the i ncreased banking and fi nanci al ri sks, wh i ch em anated fr om  
f i nanci al   l i berali zati on.
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1.   Introduct i on
Fi nanci al   l i berali zati on  has  r ecentl y  becom e almo s t   synonym ous  t o  f i nanci al  i nst abil i t y,  
especiall y but  not  exclusi vel y so i n t he case of em ergi ng m arket  econom i es (St i gl i t z,
2000;  De mi r güç-Kunt and D et r agiache, 1999;  De me t r i ades, 1999;  Ar esti s and
De me t r i ades,  1999).     The  mo s t   popul ar  expl anati on f or  t hi s i nfam ous associati on i s t hat  
f i nanci al li berali zati on usual l y fuel s a lendi ng boom ,  wh i ch funds t he creati on of an 
asset pri ce bubbl e (e.g.  Al l en and G ale 2000).  Wh e n  t he bubbl e bursts, coll apsing
coll ateral val ues result  in bank i nsol venci es and a credit  crunch,  result i ng i n severe 
r ecessions.  In t he recent fi nanci al cri sis in East  As i a
1,  t he l endi ng-boom  expl anati on 
accords reasonabl y w el l  wi t h t he experi ence of Thai l and (De me t r i ades, 1999).
Ho we v e r ,   i t   does  not   appear  t o  f i t   com fort ably  t he  case of  Sout h  Ko r ea,  wh e r e t here wa s  
hardl y a det ectable l endi ng boom  or  an obvi ous asset  pri ce bubbl e.  I nst ead,  t he Ko r ean 
cri sis appears to be very m uch a case of i nadequat ely m anaged fi nanci al r i sks.
A necdot al evidence suggest s that  Ko r ean fi nanci al int erme d i ari es borr ow ed short  i n
f oreign curr encies and acqui r ed l ow-qual i t y f oreign assets wi t h l onger  ma t uri t i es.    Thi s 
created ma t uri t y and exchange r ate m is-m atches and i ncreased overall   credit   r i sk,  since 
even w hen exchange ri sk w as hedged,  i t  w as substi t ut ed by i ncreased credit  r i sk
( De me t r i ades and  Fat t ouh,   1999).
Wh i l e a l ot   mo r e i s now   know n  about   t he  Ko r ean cri sis t han  at  t he  t i me   i t   erupt ed,  t here 
i s very l i t t l e evidence docum ent i ng t he evol ut i on of fi nanci al ri sks before the cri sis. 
Per haps m ore im port antl y,  t he rol e of fi nanci al li berali zati on i n t hi s process rem ains 
l argel y unknow n or even unrecogni sed.  A t best ,  existi ng di scussions of the rol e of 
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on are based on anecdotal  evidence.     At   wo r st,   t he r ol e of  f i nanci al 
l i berali zati on i s negl ected or mi sunderstood.     Ye t ,   i f   t here are any pol i cy l essons t o be 
l earned fr om  vi r t ual l y any fi nanci al cri sis they are almo s t  i nevi t ably related to t he 
t i mi ng  and  i mp l em entati on  of  f i nanci al  r eforms .
The paper provi des new  i nsi ght s int o t he rol e of fi nanci al li berali zati on i n t he Sout h 
Ko r ean f i nanci al  cri sis usi ng  t he  f ol l ow i ng  novel   approaches. 
( i )E p i sodes of f i nanci al l i berali zati on are docum ented by coll ecti ng pri ma r y
i nforma t i on f r om  off i cial  publ i cati ons on t he r elaxati on of  a vari ety of  f i nanci al 2
r estr aint s, incl udi ng capi t al cont r ol s, i nt erest r ate ceil i ngs and reserve
r equi r em ents on bank deposi t s.    Thi s i nforma t i on i s used t o const r uct   s u mma r y 
m easures of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   wh i ch are used i n esti ma t i ons.
( i i ) N ew  qual i t ati ve i nforma t i on on t he m echanism s by w hi ch fi nanci al
l i berali zati on l ed to i ncreased banking and fi nanci al ri sks is presented.  This 
i nforma t i on i s obt ained f r om  a new  survey of  44 I MF ,   Wo r l d Bank and Ko r ean 
off i cials w ho  had  di r ect  exposure t o  t he  events surr oundi ng  t he  Ko r ean f i nanci al 
cri sis.  The  survey  wa s   carr i ed out   i n  Wa s h i ngt on,   D. C.   duri ng  Oc t ober  1999  and 
i n Seoul  duri ng A pri l  2000.  The f i ndi ngs fr om  t he survey are tabul ated and
analysed,  provi di ng a useful  background t o t he formu l ati on of an em pir i cal
m odel .
( i i i ) N ew  econom et r i c evidence on t he evol ut i on of fi nanci al ri sks for the peri od 
1987-1997 i s presented w hich is aime d  a t  quant i f yi ng t he eff ects of fi nanci al 
l i berali zati on.     Thi s evidence i s obt ained by esti ma t i ng a condi t i onal   CAPM   i n 
wh i ch the condi t i onal  vari ance-covari ance m atr i x of port f ol i o i nnovat i ons
f ol l ow s a mu l t i vari ate GARCH  process.    The  m odel   specif i cati on all ow s t esti ng 
f or t he eff ects of f i nanci al l i berali zati on on t he condi t i onal  vari ance and
r i skiness  of  t he  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  sector  port f ol i os.  
( i v) Q uali t ati ve and quant i t ati ve fi ndi ngs are juxt aposed.   T his all ow s i nsi ght s int o 
t he ext ent t o w hi ch fi nanci al ma r ket s recogni zed the i ncreased banking and 
f i nanci al  r i sks,  wh i ch em anated f r om   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.
The  r est  of  t he  paper  i s str uct ured as f ol l ow s.   Secti on  2  provi des  a conceptual   di scussion 
of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on and i t s associati on wi t h i ncreased r i sks.  Secti on 3 docum ent s 
t he K orean experi ence. Secti on 4 sum m ari zes the fi ndi ngs fr om  t he IMF / Wo r l d Bank 
survey.  Secti on 5 presents the econom et r i c evidence on t he evol ut i on of banki ng and 
f i nanci al  r i sks.  Fi nal l y,   secti on  6  concl udes.
2.   Fi nanci al   Li berali zati on  and  Banki ng  Ri sks:  C onceptual   Issues
The  t r adit i onal   approach t ow ards f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   wh i ch dat es back t o t he wo r k 
of  Mc Ki nnon ( 1973)  and Shaw  ( 1973),   em phasi zes t he benefi t s t hat   w oul d accrue f r om  
ma r ket  det ermi ned i nt erest rates and credit  all ocati on deci sions (see also Fry,  1997).
1  For   a  r ecent  com prehensive  overvi ew   of  t he  As i an  cri sis see  H unt er,   Ka u f ma n   and  Kr ueger  ( 1999).3
The pot enti al benefi t s of f i nanci al l i berali zati on i ncl ude greater l evels of f i nanci al
savings  and i nvest me n t ,   as we l l   as i mp r ovem ent s i n r esource all ocati on,   wh i ch em anate 
f r om  m ore product i ve i nvest me n t s. I t  i s im port ant t o not e that  even though t hi s
l i t erature predated the econom i cs of informa t i on revol ut i on,  wh i ch aft er all  expl ained 
t he rai son d’être for banks and fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons,  it  nevert hel ess had an enorm ous 
i m pact on econom i c pol i cy through t he Brett on W oods i nst i t ut i ons,  since fi nanci al
l i berali zati on becam e an im port ant elem ent of the set  of pol i cies associated w it h t he 
‘ Wa s h i ngt on consensus’.  I n spi t e of unsuccessful  i mp l em entati on of f i nanci al
l i berali zati on  i n  Lat i n  Ame r i ca and  ot her  count r i es i n  t he  l ate sevent i es and  eight i es,  t he 
core of t he fi nanci al l i berali zati on t hesi s has rem ained i nt act,  even though som e
peri pheral  concessions  we r e ma d e ,   i ncl udi ng acknow l edgi ng t he i m port ance of  pol i cies 
and i nst i t ut i ons t hat  are expected to address m arket  f ail ures (see A resti s and
De me t r i ades, 1999).  These incl uded t he appropri ate ‘sequenci ng’ of reforms ,  in t he 
f orm o f  att aini ng m acroeconom i c stabil i t y and adequat e prudent i al regul ati on of the 
f i nanci al  system ,  pri or  t o  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   as we l l   as a specif i c order  f or  f i nanci al 
r eforms ,   wi t h  t he  l i berali zati on  of  short -term  capit al  f l ow s  bei ng  pl aced at  t he  end  of  t he 
r eform  sequence    ( see f or  exam ple Mc Ki nnon,   1981).
W e posi t  i n t hi s secti on t hat  t he i m pact of fi nanci al l i berali zati on on banki ng and 
f i nanci al r i sks is am biguous.  Wh i l e fi nanci al l i berali zati on t ypi call y off ers greater
opport uni t i es for di versif i cati on,  by off eri ng banks and ot her fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons a 
wi der  r ange of  asset  choi ces,  wh i ch i n pri nci pl e shoul d l ead t o mo r e eff i cient  port f ol i o 
choi ces,  i t   ma y   we l l   expose  t hem   t o  greater  r i sks,  due  t o  l ack of  expert i se i n  operati ng  i n 
new  m arket s, w eaknesses in prudent i al  r egul ati on and/ or  mo r al  hazard em anati ng f r om  
i nforma t i on probl em s.  The m odern l i t erature on fi nanci al li berali zati on refl ects these 
t wo   opposi ng  f orces.    The  r est  of  t hi s secti on  draw s on  t hi s l i t erature t o  argue  t he  case.
Ca pi t al  account   l i berali zati on  ma y   i n  pri nci pl e be  expected t o:   ( i )   off er  i nvest ors greater 
opport uni t i es for ri sk diversif i cati on,  achieving m ore eff ecti ve i nsurance than purely 
dom est i c arr angem ent s w oul d  all ow ,   ( i i )   r aise consum er  we l f are by  all ow i ng  a sm oot her 
consum pt i on pat h,  ( i i i )   r esult   i n a mo r e eff i cient  all ocati on of  r esources by channell i ng 
t he wo r l d’s savings t ow ards t he wo r l d' s mo s t   product i ve i nvest me n t   opport uni t i es,  ( i v) 
com plem ent  dom est i c savings,   t hereby i ncreasing i nvest me n t   and prom ot i ng econom i c 4
grow t h w i t hout  sharp i ncreases in savi ngs rates, and (i v) low er the cost  of capit al to 
credit wo r t hy fi r m s and sm al l  and m edi um  ent erpri ses (see O bstf eld and Rogoff ,  1996 
and  Edwar ds,   1999).  
I n r eali t y capit al  account   l i berali zati on has presented i m port ant  chall enges and r i sks f or 
pol i cym akers (see, for exam ple, St i gl i t z, 2000).  Specif i call y,  t he recent Eas t  As i an
f i nanci al  cri sis has show n t hat   capit al  account   l i berali zati on can m agni f y t he r i sks and 
w eaknesses of the banki ng system , especiall y w hen capit al infl ow s are int erme d i ated 
t hrough poorl y m anaged and i l l -supervi sed banki ng system s. The i nt erme d i ati on of
capit al infl ow s t hrough such banki ng system s usual l y l eads to an expansi on i n banks’ 
l endi ng  acti vi t y  as banks  have  mo r e r esources avail able f or  l endi ng.   Thi s generates wh a t  
i s know n as a ' l endi ng boom ' .  Fur t hermo r e, dom est i c banks can expl oi t  ma r ket
i mp e r f ecti ons t o generate over-opt i mi sti c expectati ons know i ng t hat  in case of default  
t he governm ent  wi l l  be forced to bai l  out  di str essed banks and fi r ms  ( Mc Ki nnon and 
Pi l l ,  1997).  Si nce entr epreneurs and  fi r m s do not  have enough i nforma t i on t o assess 
banks’ signal s adequately,  they consi der these signal s as corr ect and hence base t hei r  
i nvest me n t  decisions on such over -opt i mi sti c expectati ons.  Consequent l y,  t hey bi d
eagerl y for f unds t o fi nance t hei r  i nvest me n t s, f urt her f uel l i ng t he l endi ng boom
( Mc Ki nnon  and  Pi l l ,   op. cit ) .
2
On e   undesi r able consequence of  a l endi ng boom  f uel l ed by capit al  i nfl ow s i s t hat   i t   can 
exacerbat e t he ma t uri t y and r i sk mi sm atch bet w een banks’  assets and l i abil i t i es.  Thi s i s 
especiall y t r ue i f capit al infl ow s are short -term  and i n foreign curr ency w hil e banks'  
l oans are long-t erm  and i n dom est i c curr ency. Fur t hermo r e, unregul ated capit al fl ow s 
m ay be m i sall ocated tow ards ri sky proj ects, speculati ve acti vi t i es, the equi t y m arket ,  
and cycli cal sectors such as real estate. In t he short  run,  t he expansi on of l endi ng
acti vi t y bi ds up ( i nfl ates)  t he pri ce of  assets i n t hese ma r ket s generati ng an asset  pri ce 
bubbl e. Such bubbl es inevi t ably l ead to det eri orati on i n banks'  port f ol i os as banks 
i ncrease thei r  hol di ngs of ' i nfl ated'  assets and becom e heavil y exposed t o cycli cal
sectors.
2 Wh a t  is int eresti ng i n M cK i nnon and Pi l l ’ s fr am ew ork i s that  banks fi nance t he l endi ng boom  by 
att r acti ng  capit al  f r om   abroad.   The  authors  refer t o  t hi s process  as  t he  “over - borr ow i ng”  syndrom e.5
Do me s t i c f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   wh i ch com pri ses ma i nl y of  r elaxati on of  cont r ol s on 
i nt erest rates, l i f t i ng of restr i cti ons on t he asset choi ces of banks and l ow eri ng or 
abol i shing  r eserve  r equi r em ents,  can also signi f i cantl y  i ncrease t he  r i sks i n  t he  f i nanci al 
sector (Fi scher and C henard,  1997;  De mi r güç-K unt  and D et r agiache, 1998;  St i gl i t z, 
1994).   Int ense com peti t i on t hat  usual l y fol l ow s fi nanci al li berali zati on l ow ers profi t s 
f or banks,  wh i ch in t urn erodes banks’ fr anchise values and l ow ers thei r  incenti ve for 
ma k i ng  good  l oans.   Thi s exacerbat es t he  probl em s of  mo r al  hazard  and  l oot i ng  behavi or 
i n t he banki ng system  ( see He l l ma n ,   Mu r dock,   and St i gl i t z,  2000;   Ak e r l of  and Rome r ,  
1993).   These have t he eff ect  of  i ncreasing t he r i skiness of  banks’  port f ol i os.   A  closel y 
r elated argum ent  is that  fi nanci al li berali zati on erodes t he prot ecti on provi ded by a 
r egul ated t erm  str uct ure and  stable i nt erme d i ati on  ma r gi n  ( Go l dst ein  and  Tur ner,   1996).  
Thi s ma y   i nt ensif y t he mo r al  hazard probl em ,  encouraging banks t o engage i n l endi ng 
t o  mo r e r i sky  borr ow ers i n  order  t o  i ncrease t he  r eturns  on  t hei r   f unds.   I ndeed,  He l l ma n  
et al  (2000) show  t hat  cert ain t ypes of fi nanci al restr aint s, such as ceil i ngs on deposi t  
r ates,  by keeping profi t   ma r gi ns wi t hi n cert ain l i mi t s can r educe r educe t he r i skiness of 
banks’ port f ol i os by l i mi t i ng banks’ i ncenti ves t o i nvest  i n assets that  f acil i t ate
gam bl i ng.   Fi nanci al  l i berali zati on can also change t he banks’  custom er  base wi t h l arger 
and bet t er-know n f i r ms   r aising a l arger  share of  f undi ng t hrough t he securi t i es ma r ket s 
or i nt ernat i onal  ma r ket s. The r esult i ng eff ect i s generall y det eri orati on i n t he ri sk
com posi t i on of the bank and fi nanci al sector’ s loan port f ol i os (Fi scher and Chenard,  
1997).
I n pri nci pl e,  how ever,   dom est i c f i nanci al  l i berali zati on can generate eff i ciency gai ns by 
r em ovi ng  vari ous  const r aint s on  banks’  f easibl e r i sk-return f r ont i er,   wh i ch ma y   r esult   i n 
l ow er overall  banki ng ri sks (H ogan and Sharpe,  1984).  Fur t hermo r e, f i nanci al
l i berali zati on ma y   open new  profi t able opport uni t i es,  wh i ch bankers coul d expl oi t   and 
t hereby avoi d t he erosi on of  t hei r   f r anchise val ue.
3  H ence,  wh i l e a case coul d be ma d e  
t hat   t he  i m pact  of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  on  t he  f i nanci al  sector’ s overall   l evel  of  r i sk i s 
am biguous  at  t he  t heoreti cal  l evel,   mo s t   studi es usual l y  associate f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
wi t h  hi gher  r i sks ( Fi scher  and  C henard,   1997;   He l l ma n   et  al ,   2000).
3 Ho we v e r ,  He l l ma n  e t  al (2000) argue t hat  greater i nvest me n t  opport uni t i es, wi de ranges of new
acti vi t i es such as deri vat i ve t r ades and foreign curr ency tr ansacti ons and greater fr eedom  t o al l ocate
assets also i ncrease  t he  pot enti al  scope  for gam bl i ng  by  banks.6
An  i m port ant elem ent of dom est i c fi nanci al li berali zati on t hat  has a di r ect im pact on 
banks’ ri skiness is reserve requi r em ents on bank deposi t s. Re s e r ve requi r em ents are 
usual l y consi dered as tax on fi nanci al int erme d i ati on,  wh i ch low er the profi t abil i t y of 
t he banki ng sector  and hence ma y   aff ect  i t s att i t ude t ow ards r i sk.  Fur t hermo r e,  r equi r ed 
r eserve rati os aff ect the l evel of li qui di t y avail able for banks and hence aff ect thei r  
l endi ng  decisions.   Mi t chell   ( 1986)  f i nds  t hat   t he  i m pact  of  r eserve  r equi r em ents on  bank 
r i skiness depends  on  t he  wa y   bank  r i sk i s m easured and on  t he  assum pti ons  ma d e   about  
r i sk aversion.   Specif i call y,   i f   bank  r i sk i s m easured by  t he  r ati o  of  banks'   r i sky  assets t o 
t ot al assets, then an i ncrease in t he requi r ed reserve rati o w i l l  dri ve dow n t he l evel of 
bank r i sk.  On   t he ot her  hand,   i f   bank r i sk i s m easured by t he probabi l i t y t hat   t he banks'  
profi t   wi l l   f all   bel ow  zero,   a r i se i n r equi r ed r eserves wi l l   also dri ve dow n bank r i sk if
and  onl y i f   t here i s i ncreasing  r elati ve  r i sk aversion.   The  r everse hol ds,   how ever,   i f   t here 
i s decreasing  r elati ve  r i sk aversion.   H ence,  at  t he  t heoreti cal  l evel,   t he  i m pact  of  r eserve 
r equi r em ents on  bank  r i skiness i s also am biguous.
4
To  sum -up,   t he t r adit i onal   f i nanci al li berali zati on thesi s,  as we l l   as i t s m odern version,  
t ends t o em phasi ze it s pot enti al benefi t s, i n t he form o f  eff i ciency gains and
opport uni t i es for di versif i cati on,  wh i ch in pri nci pl e shoul d l ed to m ore eff i cient
port f ol i o choi ces; these m ay be refl ected in bot h greater invest me n t  returns and l ow er 
r i sks,  i n  bot h  t he  r eal  and  f i nanci al  sectors.    Ho we v e r ,   skepti cs argue  t hat   because of  t he 
endem i c nature of i mp e r f ect i nforma t i on and i nst i t ut i onal  w eaknesses, associated
ma r ket  fail ures, such as m oral hazard,  coul d w el l  me a n  t hat  fi nanci al li berali zati on 
i nst ead leads to subst anti all y i ncreased fi nanci al ri sks and low er ex-post invest me n t  
r eturns.     The  Ko r ean experi ence,  t o wh i ch we   now  t urn,   r efl ects bot h t he t r adit i onal i st 
bel i efs,  wh i ch r esult ed i n under-esti ma t i on  of  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  r i sks,  as we l l   as t he 
r eali t i es of  i ncreased r i sks t hrough  ma r ket   f ail ures and  i nst i t ut i onal   w eaknesses. 
3.   Fi nanci al   Li berali zati on  i n  Sout h  K orea
I n t he l ast t w o decades or so, t he Sout h K orean fi nanci al system  w it nessed m aj or 
l i berali zati on eff ort s, especiall y on t he capit al account  f r ont .  A ccordi ng t o t he
di scussion of Secti on 2,  these regul atory changes are li kel y t o be associ ated w it h a 
4 Ge l l es (1991) show s t hat  all  the above concl usi ons hol d for any bank w i t h reserves and a ri sk-averse
ut i l i t y  f unct i on  wi t h  a m ean-standard  devi ati on  fram ew ork t hat   i s consi stent  wi t h  expected  ut i l i t y.7
change i n t he l evel  of  t he r i skiness of  Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons.   Be f ore we   present 
qual i t ati ve and quant i t ati ve evidence on t he i m pact  of  such l i berali zati on eff ort s on t he 
r i skiness of  t he Ko r ean f i nanci al  system ,  i t   i s useful   f i r st  t o di scuss bri efl y t he Ko r ean 
experi ence wi t h  capit al  account   and  dom est i c f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.
5
Capi t al  account   l i beral i zati on
I n t he l ate 1980s,  the K orean governm ent  accelerated the l i berali zati on process of it s 
capit al  account .   The  l i berali zati on of  t he capit al  account   t ook pl ace ma i nl y by r elaxing 
cont r ol s on  banks  and  corporati ons’  f und-raising  acti vi t y  i n  i nt ernat i onal   ma r ket s and  by 
all ow i ng foreigners to i nvest  i n t he K orean stock,  bond and m oney m arket s. I n
D ecem ber 1989,  foreign exchange banks w ere all ow ed t o raise off shore funds by
i ssuing  f oreign  curr ency denom i nat ed bonds  or  borr ow i ng  f r om   t he  off shore account s of 
ot her  dom est i c f oreign  exchange banks.   The  ma i n  l i berali zati on  step,  how ever,   occurr ed 
i n January 1992,  w hen non-resident s w ere all ow ed for the fi r st ti me  t o i nvest  in any 
dom est i c stock  unl ess specif i ed i n  som e part i cular  act,   even t hough som e l i mi t s we r e set 
on t he l evel of t ot al foreign i nvest me n t .
6 Du r i ng Sept em ber 1992 regul ati ons on t he 
overseas i ssue of  f oreign  curr ency denom i nat ed securi t i es we r e greatl y  eased.    The  t ype 
of  securi t i es t hat   coul d be i ssued abroad by Ko r ean r esident s,  r estr i cted previousl y  onl y 
t o bonds,  convert i bl e bonds,  bonds w i t h w arr ants and stock deposi t ory receipt s, we r e 
expanded t o i ncl ude negot i able C D s and com m ercial papers. Fur t hermo r e, t he
authori zati on  procedures necessary  f or  t he  i ssue of  securi t i es we r e greatl y simp l i f i ed. 
Du r i ng  1993-1998,   t he  Ko r ean governm ent   r esum ed t he  openi ng  of  i t s f i nanci al  ma r ket s 
t o foreign i nvest ors. For  inst ance, in Jul y 1994,  the governm ent  part i all y opened t he 
dom est i c bond m arket  all ow i ng non-resident s to purchase non-guaranteed convert i bl e 
bonds i ssues by sm all   and me d i um  enterpri ses ( SM Es)   subj ect  t o cert ain l i mi t ati ons.   I n 
Ma y   1996,   non-resident s we r e all ow ed t o purchase and t r ade bonds wi t h wa r r ants and 
t o t r ade the st ock i ndex fut ures on t he K orean Stock Exchange.  In June 1997,foreign
i nvest ors w ere granted access to non-guaranteed bonds of  SM Es  and of  congl om erates 
5 A mo r e detail ed discussion can be found i n t he appendi x.  The i nforma t i on i n t hi s secti on and t he 
appendi x  wa s   obt ained  f r om   t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea  A nnual   Report s.
6 For  i nst ance, a 3%  li mi t  on i nvest me n t  by an i ndi vi dual  f oreign and 10%  l i mi t  on t ot al foreign 
i nvest me n t  we r e appli ed respecti vel y and i n t he case of publ i c uti l i t i es and those com panies in i nfant 
i ndust r y,   t he  t ot al  f oreign  i nvest me n t   l i mi t   i s set  at  8% .8
and by 1998,   all   ki nds of  securi t i es sti pul ated i n t he Securi t i es and Exchange Ac t   we r e 
m ade avail able to foreign i nvest ors.
7 A not her i m port ant devel opm ent  has been t he
abol i t i on of  ceil i ngs on t he purchase of  dom est i c stocks by f oreigners.  I n parall el  wi t h 
t hese devel opm ent s, cont r ol s on foreign borr ow i ng w ere largel y di sm antl ed duri ng
1993-1995.  In February 1993,  overseas branches of dom est i c banks w ere permi t t ed to 
suppl y l oans t o K orean resident s engaged i n t he t r ading of the com m odi t y fut ures or 
f i nanci al fut ures. Lat er in t he sam e year, securi t y i ssuers in foreign m arket s w ere no 
l onger r equi r ed to obt ain permi ssion before issuing foreign curr ency denom i nat ed
securi t i es. Fur t hermo r e, t he l i st of corporati ons and banks t hat  coul d i ssue foreign
securi t i es w as considerably w i dened.  By Oc t ober 1996,  t he governm ent  di sm antl ed 
mo s t   of  t he r estr i cti ons on di r ect  f oreign borr ow i ngs,   enabli ng even non-m anufacturi ng
SM Es  t o  r eceive  l oans  f r om   abroad.
I nt erest  Rat e Li beral i zati on
Un l i ke t he capit al account  l i berali zati on process, dom est i c fi nanci al l i berali zati on
occurr ed gradual l y over a long peri od of t i me .  At  t he heart  of dom est i c fi nanci al
l i berali zati on i n  Ko r ea wa s   t he  l i berali zati on  of  i nt erest  r ates.  Si nce t he  earl y  1960s,   one 
of the m ost  im port ant characteri sti cs of the Sout h K orean credit  ma r ket  has been t he 
di r ect int ervent i on of the st ate in t he pri cing of credit ,  wh i ch w as m ainl y achieved 
t hrough cont r ol s on l endi ng,  and deposi t  i nt erest r ates. I n Sept em ber 1979,  t he
M onet ary Board abol i shed the m axi mu m i nt erest rate on bank l oans.  Ho we v e r ,  gi ven 
Ko r ean banks’ inexperi ence in set t i ng i nt erest rates, the K orean B ankers A ssociati on 
decided t o l i nk t he i nt erest  r ate on l oans t o t he Bank of  Ko r ea’s r ediscount   r ate wh i ch 
seri ousl y l i mi t ed t he abil i t y of  Ko r ean banks t o alt er  l endi ng r ates.  I n July 1984,   banks 
we r e all ow ed t o charge di f f erent rates accordi ng t o t he credit wo r t hi ness of borr ow ers 
but   wi t hi n a narr ow  band.  It  is onl y i n D ecem ber 1988 t hat  banks began t o enj oy 
com plete f r eedom  over  i nt erest  r ate det ermi nat i on wh e n   cont r ol s on l endi ng r ates f r om  
banks and non-bank fi nanci al int erme d i ari es w ere relaxed despit e the fact that  som e 
cont r ol s on  pol i cy  l oans  r em ained  i n  pl ace.  I n  a m ove  t ow ards  f urt her  l i berali zati on,   t he 
i nt erest  r ate on pol i cy based l oans we r e l i berali zed i n July 1995 and,   i n January 1996,  
7  For   exam ple,  short-t erm  f i nanci al  product s such as com m ercial  papers,  c o mme r cial  bi l l s,  and  t r ade bi l l s 
and  CDs   i ssued by  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons;   and  unl i sted  stocks  and  bonds.9
t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea l i f t ed t he  r estr i cti on  on  t he  size of  prem ium   a bank  coul d  charge  over 
i t s pri me   l endi ng r ate.
The  r elaxati on  of  cont r ol s on  deposi t   r ates i n  Ko r ea wa s   very  gradual .   Al t hough  i n  1979 
t he  M onet ary  Boa r d  abol i shed t he  ma x i mu m  i nt erest  r ate on  personal   checking  deposi t s, 
i t  is not  unt i l  D ecem ber 1988,  wh e n  t he M onet ary Board l i berali zed int erest rates on 
cert ain t i m e and savi ng deposi t s, t hat  banks st art ed enjoyi ng som e fr eedom  i n
det ermi ni ng deposi t  rates.
8 In N ovem ber 1991,  the scope of ini t i al li berali zati on w as 
extended t o cover rates on l ong-t erm  deposi t s w it h a m at uri t y of 3 year s off ered by 
banks,  mu t ual  credit  facil i t i es, and credit  uni ons.  It  is onl y as recentl y as N ovem ber 
1995  t hat   t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea f r eed up  t he  r em aini ng  r egul ated i nt erest  r ates on  bank  and 
non-bank  t i me   deposi t s wi t h ma t uri t y of  l ess t han six m ont hs.
The Bank of Ko r ea concentr ated it s eff ort s in devel opi ng m oney m arket s by relaxing 
cont r ol s on  t he  i ssue and  sale of  existi ng  i nst r um ent s and  i nt r oduci ng  new   ones.   I n  June 
1982,   t he  call   r ate,  wh i ch had  been subj ect  t o  an upper  l i mi t   of  16%   wa s   deregul ated.  I n 
Ma r ch 1986,  the rates on negot i able C D s, int r oduced onl y i n June 1984,  we r e also 
l i berali zed.  Fur t her  l i berali zati on m easures t ook pl ace i n D ecem ber  1988 wh e n   i nt erest 
r ate on repurchase agreem ents (RPs ) ,  com m ercial papers of cert ain m at uri t i es (CPs ) ,  
f i nanci al debent ures and corporate bonds w ere ful l y l i berali zed. The maj or change 
how ever cam e in O ct ober 1989,  wh e n  t he governm ent  me r ged t he call  ma r ket s,
previousl y segm ented i nt o an i nt er-bank ma r ket   ma i nl y f or  banks and over  t he count er 
ma r ket  bet w een non-bank fi nanci al int erme d i ari es and li berali zed the i nt erbank rate. 
Fur t her  l i berali zati on  wa s   carr i ed i n  t he  1990s  wh e r e t he  M onet ary  Boa r d  l i berali zed t he 
r ates on governm ent  and publ i c bonds,  short ened the m at uri t y of RPs ,  CD s and ot her 
f i nanci al  i nst r um ent s,  and  signi f i cantl y  deregul ated t he  bond  ma r ket   i n  N ovem ber  1991.  
Du r i ng t he 1992-1995 peri od,   t he bank l ow ered gradual l y t he mi ni mu m  denom i nat i ons 
of CD S and short ened the m at uri t i es of the RPs.  In fact,  by 1995 t he K orean m oney 
ma r ket s   had  becom e hi ghl y l i berali zed.
I t  em erges fr om  t hi s bri ef overvi ew  that  in t he l ast decade or so, Ko r ean fi nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons  wi t nessed  ma j or  r egul atory  changes t hat   ma y   have  i ncreased t he  r i skiness of 
8  Specif i call y,   onl y  i nt erest  r ate on  t i me   deposi t s of  ma t uri t y  greater  t han  2  years at  banks,   post al  savings 
and  credit   uni ons  and  on  t i me   and  savings  deposi t s of  ma t uri t y  greater  t han  1  year  at  mu t ual   savings  and 
f i nance  com panies  we r e  l i berali sed.10
t hese fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons.  In w hat  fol l ow s,  w e exam ine t hi s i ssue bot h qual i t ati vel y 
and  quant i t ati vel y.
4.     The   evol ut i on  of  banki ng  and  f i nanci al   risks:  qual i t ati ve  evidence 
Thi s secti on presents t he r esult s of  t wo   sets of  i nt ervi ew s carr i ed out   i n ( i )   Wa s h i ngt on,  
D. C.  duri ng t he aut um n of 1999 and (i i )  Seoul  duri ng A pri l  2000.   The int ervi ew s 
f ol l ow ed a sem i-str uct ured quest i onnai r e,  wh i ch cont ained 21 quest i ons r elati ng t o t he 
f actors t hat   caused t he cri sis.    The  r espondent s i n Wa s h i ngt on we r e 15 off i cials of  t he 
I nt ernat i onal   M onet ary  Fund  and  t he  Wo r l d  Bank  who  had  di r ect  exposure t o  t he  events 
surr oundi ng t he K orean fi nanci al cri sis.  The respondent s in Sout h K orea w ere 29
pri vat e and publ i c sector  econom i sts wi t h di r ect  experi ence of  t he f i nanci al  cri sis.  They 
i ncl uded senior  off i cials of  t he Bank of  Ko r ea, the Mi ni str y of  Fi nance and Econom i cs, 
t he K orean D evelopm ent  Inst i t ut e, the K orean Inst i t ut e of Fi nance,  pri vat e research 
i nst i t ut es (f unded by K orean chaebols),  c o mme r cial banks (bot h K orean and
i nt ernat i onal )  and ot her fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons.   Tables 1  and 2 present th e  s u mma r y 
r esponses t o seven quest i ons t hat   f ocus on t he evol ut i on of  banki ng and f i nanci al  r i sks 
and t he eff ects of fi nanci al li berali zati on,  as perceived by t he respondent s aft er the 
cri sis.
The answ ers to t hese quest i ons fr om  bot h set s  of int ervi ew s seem  to support  the vi ew  
t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  i ncreased t he  r i skiness of  t he  Ko r ean f i nanci al  sector.   Al l   t he 
r espondent s i n Wa s h i ngt on and 72%  of  t he r espondent s i n Seoul   t hought   t hat   f i nanci al 
l i berali zati on ( defi ned as t he r em oval   of  i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s and capit al  cont r ol s)  on 
bal ance - taking i nt o account  the responses of fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons and regul ators, -
i ncreased the ri sks faced by K orean fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons.  The s ur vey al so reveals 
anot her int eresti ng observat i on:  it  show s t hat  73%  of the respondent s in W ashi ngt on 
and 97%  of t he respondent s in Seoul  t hought  t hat  t he i nst i t ut i onal  f r am ew ork of
prudent i al regul ati on and supervi sion w as not  we l l  devel oped t o deal  wi t h t he ri sks 
associated wi t h subst anti al  vol um es of  capit al  f l ow s.     Al l   but   one r espondent   ( i . e.  93% ) 
i n W ashi ngt on and 86%  of t he respondent s in Seoul  t hought  t hat  Ko r ean fi nanci al
i nst i t ut i ons di d not  have i n pl ace adequate ri sk m anagem ent  system s. 87%  of
r espondent s in W ashi ngt on and 79%  of respondent s in Seoul  t hought  t hat  Ko r ean
f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  di d  not   have  t he  hum an  capit al  or  t he  expert i se t o  m anage  t he  r i sks 11
associated w it h t he i nt erme d i ati on of large am ount s of foreign capi t al.  These result s 
suggest  t hat  f i nanci al l i berali zati on m ay have result ed in i ncreased banking and
f i nanci al  r i sks due  t o  i nadequat e r i sk m anagem ent   by  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  and  expert i se 
and  due  t o  w eaknesses i n  prudent i al  r egul ati on.
Tabl e 1:  Interview  responses of  IM F  and  Wo r l d  Bank  off i cial s
Qu e s t i on   Ye s No
An s we r
M aybe D on’t   know
M any econom i sts bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
( i . e. r em oval  of i nt erest r ate restr aint s and capit al
cont r ol s)  l eads t o hi gher  i nvest me n t   r eturns.   Do   you 
agree?
10 2 2 1
Gi ven  t hat   m any  econom i sts do  bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al
l i berali zati on i ncreases invest me n t  r eturns,  do you
t hi nk t hat  it  m ay have pl ayed som e rol e in creati ng 
over- opt i mi sti c expectati ons about  i nvest me n t
payoff s?
84 3 0
Som e  econom i sts bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
l eads t o  i ncreased r i sks i n  t he  f i nanci al  system ,  i n  t he 
f orm o f  exchange ri sk, credit  ri sk and i nt erest rate
r i sk.  Do   you  agree?
14 0 1 0
Di d K orean fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons have i n pl ace the
r i sk m anagem ent  system s requi r ed to m anage t he
new  ri sks that  f i nanci al l i berali zati on m ay bri ng
about ?
01 4 1 0
Do   you t hi nk t hat   Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons we r e 
equi pped w i t h t he hum an capi t al and expert i se to
adequately m anage t he ri sks associated w it h t he
i nt erme d i ati on  of  l arge  am ount s of  f oreign  capit al?
11 3 1 0
D o you t hi nk t hat  t he i nst i t ut i onal  f r am ew ork of
prudent i al  r egul ati on  and  supervi sion  wa s   suff i cientl y 
we l l   devel oped t o deal  wi t h t he r i sks associated wi t h 
subst anti al  vol um es  of  f oreign  capit al?
01 1 2 2
Taki ng  i nt o  account   t he  new   t ypes  of  r i sks as we l l   as
t he r esponses of  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons and r egul ators 
t o t hese ri sks, w oul d you say t hat  on bal ance
f i nanci al l i berali zati on i ncreased the ri sks faced by
Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons?
15 0 0 012
Tabl e 2:  Interview  responses of  Sout h  K orean off i cial s
Qu e s t i on   Ye s No
An s we r
M aybe D on’t   know
M any econom i sts bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
( i . e. r em oval  of i nt erest r ate restr aint s and capit al
cont r ol s)  l eads t o hi gher  i nvest me n t   r eturns.   Do   you 
agree?
18 1 10 0
Gi ven  t hat   m any  econom i sts do  bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al 
l i berali zati on i ncreases invest me n t  r eturns,  do you
t hi nk t hat  it  m ay have pl ayed som e rol e in creati ng 
over- opt i mi sti c expectati ons about  i nvest me n t
payoff s?
15 6 8 0
Som e  econom i sts bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
l eads t o  i ncreased r i sks i n  t he  f i nanci al  system ,  i n  t he 
f orm o f  exchange ri sk, credit  ri sk and i nt erest rate
r i sk.  Do   you  agree?
20 3 5 1
Di d K orean fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons have i n pl ace the
r i sk m anagem ent  system s requi r ed to m anage t he
new  ri sks that  f i nanci al l i berali zati on m ay bri ng
about ?
22 5 2 0
Do   you t hi nk t hat   Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons we r e 
equi pped w i t h t he hum an capi t al and expert i se to
adequately m anage t he ri sks associated w it h t he
i nt erme d i ati on  of  l arge  am ount s of  f oreign  capit al?
12 3 5 0
D o you t hi nk t hat  t he i nst i t ut i onal  f r am ew ork of
prudent i al  r egul ati on  and  supervi sion  wa s   suff i cientl y 
we l l   devel oped t o deal  wi t h t he r i sks associated wi t h 
subst anti al  vol um es  of  f oreign  capit al?
02 8 1 0
Taki ng  i nt o  account   t he  new   t ypes  of  r i sks as we l l   as 
t he r esponses of  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons and r egul ators 
t o t hese ri sks, w oul d you say t hat  on bal ance
f i nanci al l i berali zati on i ncreased the ri sks faced by
Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons?
21 4 4 0
Fi nal l y,  the survey result s show  that roughl y t wo  t hi r ds of the respondent s in bot h 
Wa s h i ngt on and Seoul  bel i eved that  fi nanci al li berali zati on norma l l y l eads to hi gher 
i nvest me n t  returns.   Just over hal f  t he respondent s in bot h W ashi ngt on and Seoul
t hought  t hat  f i nanci al l i berali zati on pl ayed a rol e in creati ng over-opt i mi sti c
expectati ons about  i nvest me n t  payoff s in K orea.  These fi ndi ngs suggest  t hat  t he
t r adit i onal   bel i efs concerni ng f i nanci al  l i berali zati on we r e at  l east  part l y r esponsi bl e f or 
t he fi nanci al cri sis for at l east t wo  r easons. Fi r stl y,  by em phasi sing eff i ciency gains 
t hrough enhanci ng t he qual i t y of i nvest me n t ,  t hey seem ed to have cont r i but ed to13
creati ng over -opt i mi sti c expectati ons concerni ng i nvest me n t  payoff s.
9 I n fact,  ma n y
have  argued  t hat   t he  creati on  of  over-opt i mi sti c expectati ons  i s t he  ma i n  i mp e t us  behi nd 
t he l endi ng boom  and t he asset  pri ce bubbl e ( Mc Ki nnon and Pi l l ,   1997).   Secondl y,   by 
f ail i ng t o em phasi ze the greater r i sk-taking opport uni t i es that  accom pany fi nanci al
l i berali zati on  t hey  generated com placency i n  r elati on  t o  t he  r ecogni t i on  of  r i sks and  r i sk 
m anagem ent  bot h by t he fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons t hem sel ves and t he supervi sory
authori t i es.
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5.   The   Evol ut i on  of  Banki ng  and  Fi nanci al   Ri sks:  Econom etric Evi dence
I n t hi s secti on,   we   i nvest i gat e t he extent  t o wh i ch t he survey r esult s,  wh i ch i ndi cate an 
i ncrease in ri sks em anati ng fr om  fi nanci al li berali zati on,  we r e refl ected in fi nanci al 
ma r ket s.  To  t hi s end,   we   use an approach wh i ch expl oi t s t he i nforma t i on cont ained i n 
t he pri ce index of securi t i es issued by banks and ot her f i nanci al f i r m s such as
i nvest me n t   banks,   me r chant  banks and securi t i es com panies.  Specif i call y,   we   exam ine 
t he  changes i n  t he  pri ces of  t he  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  sector  port f ol i os  i n  order  t o  obt ain 
i nforma t i on  on  t he  ma r ket ’ s assessm ent  of  t he  evol ut i on  of  r i sks of  t he  Ko r ean f i nanci al 
system .  I n  order  t o  m easure t he  r i skiness of  t he  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  sector,   we   use  t he 
condi t i onal  Ca pi t al A sset Pr i cing M odel  (CAPM )  in w hi ch the condi t i onal  vari ance-
covari ance m atr i x of port f ol i o i nnovat i ons i s assum ed to fol l ow  a m ul t i vari ate
Ge n e r ali zed A utoregressive Condi t i onal  He t eroskedast i c (GARCH)  process. GARCH 
m odel s provi de a f l exibl e me t hod f or  m odel i ng t i me - v a r yi ng condi t i onal   vari ances and 
co-vari ances and m ore im port antl y capture the em pi r i cal regul ari t i es found i n st ock 
r eturns  ( Ng ,   1991).   We   i nvest i gat e t he  i m pact  of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  on  t he  vol ati l i t y 
9  Edwar ds  ( 1997)  r eaches a simi l ar  concl usi on  i n  t he  cont ext  of  t he  Me x i can cri sis wh e r e he  argues  t hat  
t he “fi nanci al me d i a, academ ic analyst s, Wa l l  St r eet expert s, and m ul t i l ateral inst i t ut i ons i nvent ed the 
Me x i can  mi r acle”  wh i ch  created  a  wa v e   of  over - opt i mi sm  not   based  on  r eal  econom i c  perf orm ance.
10  Ther e i s l i t t l e doubt   t hat   anot her  i m port ant  f actor  r esponsi bl e f or  i nadequat e r i sk m anagem ent   wa s   t he 
mo r al hazard em anati ng fr om  t he hi story of the soci ali zati on of ri sks in Sout h K orea.  Ho we v e r ,  the 
i mp l i cit   provi sion  of  safety  net s by  t he  governm ent   wa s   not   new .     I t   wa s   present  i n  Sout h  Ko r ea since t he 
earl y  1960s,   yet   no  ma j or  f i nanci al  cri sis wa s   observed  before 1997.     Go v e r nm ent   provi ded  safety  net s go 
som e wa y   i n  expl aini ng  di sincenti ves  i n  m anagi ng  r i sk,  but   t hey  do  not   expl ain  t he  i ncrease i n  r i sk t aking 
opport uni t i es t hat   accom panies f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.     I ndeed,  up  t o  t he  earl y  1990s  t he  social i zati on  of 
r i sks w as an im port ant factor in ensuri ng t he l arge i nvest me n t s undert aken by chaebols, mo s t  of wh i ch 
we r e r esponsi bl e f or  t r ansformi ng  Ko r ea i nt o  a hi ghl y  i ndust r i ali zed count r y.     I t   i s conceivabl e t hat   wi t h  a 
di f f erent set of bel i efs, nam el y one  w hi ch acknow l edged t he subst anti all y i ncreased ri sk taking 
opport uni t i es associated w it h fi nanci al li berali zati on,  necessary i mp r ovem ent s in prudent i al regul ati on,  
r i sk recogni t i on and m anagem ent  w oul d have t aken place, even in t he presence of imp l i cit safety  net s.
I ndeed,  m any  such i mp r ovem ent s have  now   t aken pl ace i n  Ko r ea i t self ,   wh e r e t he  r i sks em anati ng  f r om  
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   are now   wi del y  acknow ledged.14
of  bank and f i nanci al  sector  stock r eturns by f ocusi ng on t wo   areas of  r eforms ,   nam el y,  
dom est i c fi nanci al li berali zati on and capi t al account  li berali zati on.  Consequent l y,  we  
exam ine t he eff ects of ( i )  i nt erest r ate li berali zati on and relaxati ons of r eserve
r equi r em ents on dom est i c deposi t s, wh i ch form t he centerpi ece of vari ous at t em pts of 
dom est i c fi nanci al l i berali zati on (i i )  t he relaxati on of cont r ol s on capi t al fl ow s,  on
banki ng and fi nanci al r i sks. To t hi s end,  w e augm ent  t he condi t i onal  covari ance
equat i ons of t he G A RCH  m odel  wi t h i ndi ces of i nt erest rate li berali zati on,  reserve 
r equi r em ents and  capit al  account   l i berali zati on.
The r est of thi s secti on descri bes our m odel i ng fr am ew ork,  presents the dat a and dat a 
sources, incl udi ng t he const r uct i on of the relevant li berali zati on i ndi ces, and presents 
t he ma i n em pir i cal  f i ndi ngs.
TheM odel l i ng  Fram ework
The  CAPM   due t o Shar pe ( 1964),   Li nt er  ( 1965)  and Bl ack ( 1972)  expl ains t he r i sk of  a 
part i cular  asset  or  port f ol i o  usi ng  t he  excess r eturn  on  t he  ma r ket   port f ol i o.   Specif i call y,  
t he  condi t i onal   CAPM   m odel   f or  an asset  or  port f ol i o i   can be  stated as f ol l ow s:
E( r i t   /   W t -1)   =  bi t   E( r mt /W t - 1)   =  d  Ht   wt - 1 ( 1)
Wh e r er i ti s t he r eturn on port f ol i o i   i n excess of  t he r eturn on t he r i sk-fr ee asset,   r mti s
t he r eturn on t he ma r ket   port f ol i o i n excess of  t he r eturn on t he r i sk-fr ee asset,   d i s t he 
aggregate m easure of  r elati ve  r i sk,  Ht   i s t he  condi t i onal   covari ance ma t r i x  wi t h  elem ents 
⎨hi j t ⎬,wt - 1 i s the vect or of assets w eight s in t he m arket  port f ol i om ,  and bi ti s the 
condi t i onal   bet a of  port f ol i o i   wi t h t he ma r ket   port f ol i o and r epresents t he dependence 
on  ma r ket   port f ol i o  r i sk.  bi tcan be  defi ned  as f ol l ow s:
bi t   =  h i mt   /   h mmt ( 2)
wh e r eh i mti s t he  condi t i onal   covari ance bet w een t he  r eturn  on  port f ol i o i   and  t he  ma r ket  
port f ol i o  and hmmt   i s t he condi t i onal   vari ance of  t he ma r ket   port f ol i o.   I n t hi s version of 
t he CAPM ,   all   mome n t s are ma d e   condi t i onal   on t he i nforma t i on avail able at  t i me  t– 1
as gi ven  by  t he  i nforma t i on  set  W t -1.15
For  esti ma t i on purposes,  it  is useful  to decom pose t he actual  return on t he di f f erent 
port f ol i os i nt o f orecastable and unforecastable part s:
r i t     =  E( r i t   /   W t -1)   +u i t ( 3)
r mt   =  E( r mt /W t - 1)     +  u mt ( 4)
wh e r er i t   and r mtare actual   or  r eali zed r eturns and ui t   and umt   denot e t he colum n vectors 
of t he di f f erences betw een reali zed excess returns and expect ed excess returns.
Subst i t ut i ng ( 1)  i nt o  ( 3)  and  usi ng  t he  defi ni t i on  of  bi t ,   we   obt ain  t he  f ol l ow i ng:  
r i t   =  (   hi mt/   h mmt)πmt   +  ui t i =1, 2( 5)
wh e r e πmt =E ( r mt /W t - 1) .For   t he purposes of  t hi s study,   we   i ncl ude,   i n addi t i on t o t he 
ma r ket  port f ol i o,  t he banki ng sect or and fi nanci al  sector port f ol i os,  hence i =1, 2,
r especti vel y.
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We  s t ack the i nnovat i ons fr om  t he banki ng sect or,  the fi nanci al sector and t he m arket  
port f ol i o  i nt o  t he  vector  etwh e r e
et   / W t -1 =  ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
mt
i t
u
u
~  N( 0,   Ht )( 6)
and  t he  condi t i onal   vari ance-covari ance ma t r i x  of  asset  i nnovat i ons  i n  ( 6)  i s assum ed t o 
f ol l ow  a mu l t i vari ate GARCH  process ( Bol l erslev,  1990).   Fol l ow i ng Bol l erslev,  Engl e 
and W ool dri dge (1988),  w e assum e that  t he i nnovat i on vect or f ol l ow s a simp l e
GARCH( 1, 1) process. The s i mp l est generali zati on of the  GARCH( 1, 1) m odel  can be 
stated  as: 
( et   / W t - 1)  ~  N( 0,   Ht )
Vech(Ht ) = w  +  y  Vech(Ht -1)   + Λ Vech(e t -1 e’   t - 1)( 7)
wh e r e Vech(. )   denot es t he  colum n-st acking  operator  of  t he  l ow er  port i on  of  a s y mme t r i c 
ma t r i x,et   i s an ( N·1)  vector  of  i nnovat i ons,   w  i s a ( ½  N( N+1)   ·1)  param eter  vector,   and 
y and Λ are( ½  N( N+1)   ·  ½  N( N+1) )   ma t r i ces of  const ant  param eters.  The  specif i cati on 
i n (8) has  (½N
2( N+1)
 2 + ½ N( N+1) )  param eters in t he condi t i onal  vari ance and 
covari ances, wh i ch m akes esti ma t i on of t he system  of equat i ons practi call y
unm anageable. I n our simp l e three-port f ol i o m ul t i vari ate  GARCH( 1, 1) m odel ,  t he
num ber  of  param eters t o be esti ma t ed w oul d be 78.   I n order  t o achieve t r actabil i t y,   we  
11 In pri nci pl e, w e coul d use dat a on st ock pri ces of indi vi dual  c o mme r cial banks,  invest me n t   banks,  
securi t i es com panies, etc. Ho we v e r ,  the i ncl usi on of a w ide l i st of stocks ent ail s the est i ma t i on of too 
m any  param eters.16
need to i m pose som e reasonabl e restr i cti ons on t he vari ance-covari ance m atr i x.
Bol l erslev,  Engl e and W ool dri dge ( 1988)    suggest   t hat   t he covari ance ma t r i x i s wr i t t en 
as a set of uni vari ate  GARCH mode l s w here the condi t i onal  covari ance of each
port f ol i o i s assum ed t o depend onl y on i t s ow n l agged covari ance and t he cross product  
of past  forecast err ors.
12 Thi s can be obt ained by m aki ng t he m at r i ces y and Λ   i n ( 8) 
di agonal .   I n  t hi s r estr i cted m odel ,   t he  num ber  of  param eters w oul d  be  3N(N+1) / 2,   hence
f or our three-port f ol i o m odel ,  the num ber of param eters to be est i ma t ed w oul d be 18.  
Ba s e d  on  t hi s specif i cati on,   t he  elem ent  ( i , j )   of  Ht   i s gi ven by:
hi j t   = wi j   +  a  i j   hi j t - 1  +  b  i j   ui t - 1uj t - 1 ( 8)
We   augm ent   t he condi t i onal   vari ance and covari ance equat i ons t o i ncorporate m easures 
of int erest rate li berali zati on,  reserve requi r em ents on dom est i c dem and deposi t s and 
capit al  account   l i berali zati on.   As   post ul ated i n secti on 2,   all   t hese i ndi ces are l i kel y t o 
have an i m pact on t he vol ati l i t y of bank st ock returns.  In addi t i on,  the excess m arket  
r eturn equat i on (4) i ncorporates indi ces on int erest r ate and capit al account
l i berali zati on.
13 It  i s oft en argued i n t he l i t erature that  a shif t  fr om  a ‘f i nanci all y
r epressed’ econom y t o a ‘f i nanci all y l i berali zed’ econom y i s li kel y t o result  in m ore 
eff i cient all ocati on of resources, wh i ch has the i m pact of i ncreasing t he return on
i nvest me n t .
14  Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s now  wi del y r ecogni zed t hat   i n t he presence of  i nforma t i on 
a s y mme t r i es and cont r act enforcem ent probl em s, i t  i s not  necessari l y t r ue t hat  t he 
banki ng system  w il l  all ocate resources to proj ects or fi r ms  wi t h t he hi ghest  return.  
Fur t hermo r e, in t he presence of inadequat e regul ati on and bank supervi sion,  capit al 
account  l i berali zati on m ay,  i n fact,  have an adverse im pact on product i vi t y.  For
i nst ance,  i n  Mc Ki nnon  and  Pi l l ’ s ( 1997)  f r am ew ork,   dom est i c banks  can expl oi t   ma r ket  
i mp e r f ecti ons and generate ‘over -opt i mi sti c’ expectati ons.  As  a  r esult ,  entr epreneurs 
and fi r ms  wi l l  bi d eagerl y for funds t o fi nance t hei r  invest me n t s, creati ng a l endi ng 
boom  and an asset  pri ce bubbl e.  Pr i ce di stort i ons and r esource mi sall ocati ons of  t hese 
t ypes have an adverse im pact on t he product i vi t y of capit al.  Gi ven t hese com peti ng 
expl anati ons,   t he  i m pact  of  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on on ma r ket   r eturns i s am biguous.
12  See  also Ng   ( 1991)  and  Engl e  and  Kr oner  ( 1993).
13 Ther e does  not   seem  be  any  str ong  t heoreti cal  j ust i f i cati on  f or  r eserve  r equi r em ents t o  have  an i m pact 
on  t he  ma r ket   r eturn;   hence  t hi s vari able  i s not   i ncl uded  i n  t he  ma r ket   r eturn  equat i on.  17
The com plete system  of equat i ons of our t hree-port f ol i o m odel  usi ng t he di agonal
r epresentati on  i s gi ven  by:
r mt   =  a 0  +  a 1  I NT  t   +  a 2  CAP  t   +  u mt ( 9. 1)
hmmt   =  w  01  +  a11  h mmt - 1  +  b11  u m
2
  t - 1+ d11  I NT  t    +  q11  RD  t     +  g 11  CAP t ( 9. 2)
h11t   =  w  02  +  a22  h11t - 1  +  b22  u 1
2
t -1   + d22  I NT   t     +  q 22  RD  t     +  g 22  CAP  t   ( 9. 3)
h22t   =  w  03  +  a33  h22t - 1  +  b33  u 2
2
t -1       + d33  I NT   t     +  q 33  RD  t     +  g 33  CAP  t   ( 9. 4)
h1m t   =  w  04  +  a44  h 1m t -1  +  b44  u 1t - 1u mt - 1  + d44I NT   t     +  q 44  RD  t     +  g 44CAP  t ( 9. 5)
h2m t   =  w  05  +  a55  h 2m t -1  +  b55  u 2t - 1u mt - 1  + d55  I NT   t     +  q 55  RD  t     +g 55  CAP  t ( 9. 6)
h12t   =  w  06  +  a66  h12t - 1  +  b66  u 1t - 1u 2t - 1 + d66  I NT  t     +  q66  RD  t     +g 66  CAP  t   ( 9. 7)
r 1t   =  (   h1m t/   hmmt)πmt   +  u 1t ( 9. 8)
r 2t   =  (   h2m t/   hmmt)πmt   +  u 2t ( 9. 9)
wh e r eI NT,RD,   and  CAP  are t he  m easures r elati ng  t o  i nt erest  r ate l i berali zati on,   r eserve 
r equi r em ents on dom est i c dem and deposi t s and capit al account  l i berali zati on,
r especti vel y.Thi s system  of  equat i ons can be esti ma t ed usi ng t he me t hod of  ma x i mu m 
l i kel i hood assum i ng t he condi t i onal  norma l i t y of the forecast err ors,
15 wh e r e the l og-
l i kel i hood f unct i on i s as f ol l ow s:
Ln  L( f)   =  const   –  ½ l n
t ∑ | Ht| –  ½ 
t ∑ ( 1
1
1 −
−
− t t t H ' e e ) ,( 10)
and f  cont ains  t he  unknow n  param eters i n  r mt ,et   and  Ht .
Da t a
The Kor ean stock pri ce index (KOSPI )  is used as a proxy for the m arket  port f ol i o.
W eekly  dat a on  KOSPI ,   t he  bank  and  f i nanci al  sector  i ndi ces f or  t he  peri od  7/ 1/ 1987  t o 
29/ 7/ 1997 w ere obt ained fr om  D at aStr eam .
16 The t hree indi ces are expressed in l ocal 
curr ency. The r ate of return on t he port f ol i o i s defi ned as t he fi r st di f f erence of the 
14  See  Mc Ki nnon  ( 1973)  and  Shaw  ( 1973)  f or  a  sem inal   cont r i but i on.
15  The  quasi - ma x i mu m  l i kel i hood me t hod,   wh i ch provi des consi stent  esti ma t es provi ded  t hat   t he  f i r st  and 
second m om ent s of the st andardi sed di str i but i on can be specif i ed, can also be used i f  there are sm all  
depart ures f r om  norma l i t y ( see Bol l erslev and W ool dri dge ( 1992)) .   Ho we v e r ,   i n t hi s em pir i cal  wo r k,   t hi s 
assum pti on  cannot   be  r ejected  and  we   use  t he  me t hod  of  ma x i mu m  l i kel i hood.
16 No t e that  duri ng t hi s peri od,  the K orean governm ent  rem oved m ost  cont r ol s on i nt erest rates and 
em barked on a program  of capit al account  l i berali zati on.  H ence, t hi s sam ple all ow s us t o exam ine
wh e t her the relaxati on of vari ous cont r ol s had an i m pact on t he ri skiness of banks and ot her fi nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons.   Gi ven t hat   t he Eas t   As i an cri sis mu s t   have generated pow erf ul   shocks t o t he r eturn on t he 
vari ous  port f ol i os,   we   exclude  t he  l ast  quarter  of  1997  f r om   our  esti ma t i on  sam ple.18
l ogari t hm i c stock pri ce index and excess returns are com puted i n l ocal curr ency in 
excess of  t he overni ght   call   r ate ( calculated on a w eekly basi s),   wh i ch acts as a proxy 
f or  t he  r i sk-fr ee i nt erest  r ate. 
Fi gures 1a-1c i n t he appendi x pl ot   t he ma r ket   excess r eturn seri es and t he t w o-port f ol i o
excess r eturns seri es.  These f i gures show  t hat   excess r eturns on t he vari ous i ndi ces are, 
on average,  zero over  t he peri od ( i n f act  t he m ean r eturn on t he t hree di f f erent  i ndi ces 
are insi gni f i cantl y di f f erent fr om  zero duri ng t he peri od under study).  The gr aphs al so 
show  peri ods of clust ers of hi gh and l ow  vol ati l i t y,  suggest i ng t he presence of
autoregressive condi t i onal  het eroskedast i cit y (ARCH)  eff ects. The pr esence of these 
eff ects cannot   be r ejected ( usi ng LM   and port ma n t eau Lj ung-Box t ests)  and t he use of 
t he  GARCH  m odel i ng  f r am ew ork  descri bed  earl i er  t herefore appears wa r r anted. 
The  const r uct i on of  t he i ndi ces uti l i ses t he det ail ed i nforma t i on about   f i nanci al  r eforms  
s u mma r i zed i n appendi x I I   and obt ained f r om  t he annual   r eport s of  t he Bank of  Ko r ea. 
Specif i call y,  t he m easures of i nt erest r ate and capit al account  l i berali zati on are
const r uct ed using i nforma t i on and dat a obt ained fr om  t he Bank of Ko r ea, A nnual
A ccount s. They are assum ed to t ake a value of one pri or t o any relaxati ons,  and 
decrease in val ue w henever f i nanci al restr aint s are relaxed or r em oved;  t hey are
t hereforei ncreasi ng  wi t h  t he  severi t y  of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s,  and  decreasing  as f i nanci al 
l i berali zati on progresses. Specif i call y,  f or t he const r uct i on of t he i nt erest r ate
l i berali zati on i ndex,  we  u s e  i nforma t i on on cont r ol s on deposi t   r ates,  l endi ng r ates and 
m oney ma r ket   r ates.    St r ong posi t i ve corr elati on bet w een t he l endi ng r ate,  deposi t   r ate 
and m oney ma r ket   i ndi ces all ow s us t o average t hem  out   i nt o a singl e m easure,  wh i ch 
we   call   ‘ t he  i nt erest  r ate l i ber ali zati on  i ndex’.   For   t he  const r uct i on  of  t he  capit al  account  
l i berali zati on i ndex we   use det ail ed i nforma t i on on t he r elaxati on of  cont r ol s on banks 
and corporati ons’ f und-raising act i vi t y i n i nt ernat i onal  ma r ket s and relaxati on of
r estr i cti ons  on  f oreign  i nvest me n t   i n  t he  Ko r ean stock,   bond  and  m oney  ma r ket s.
Fi gure 2a show s t he m ovem ent   of  t he i nt erest  r ate l i berali zati on i ndex.   As   can be seen, 
i t   r efl ects t he  changes i n  t he  underl yi ng  pol i cy vari ables r easonabl y  we l l .   The  r elaxati on 
of  l endi ng  and  deposi t   r ate cont r ol s i n  D ecem ber  1988  i s r efl ected i n  a sharp  drop  of  t he 
m easure for that  m ont h.  The m easure then drops sharpl y duri ng t he second w ave of 19
r eform ( 1992-1995 peri od).  Du r i ng t hat  peri od,  mo s t  of t he rem aini ng cont r ol s on
deposi t ,  lendi ng and m oney ma r ket   r ates we r e abol i shed.  Fi gure 2b pl ot s t he m ovem ent  
of  t he  capit al  account   l i berali zati on  i ndex.   The  f i gure r eveals t hat   t he  i ndex  also r efl ects 
t he underl yi ng m easures qui t e accurately.   I t   show s a sharp decli ne i n t he begi nni ng of 
1992  wh e n   t he K orean stock ma r ket   wa s   open t o f oreign i nvest ors and dom est i c banks 
we r e all ow ed t o r aise f unds i n i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  ma r ket s.  I n subsequent   years,  mo s t  
cont r ol s on capi t al infl ow s w ere gradual l y rem oved and t hi s is refl ected in t he gradual  
decli ne of the capit al account  index.  Fi gures 2a and 2b al so show  a hi gh corr elati on 
( 0. 97)  bet w een t hese t wo   i ndi ces.  Cl earl y,   t hi s poses probl em s f or  esti ma t i on purposes,  
and w e address thi s issue using Pri nci pal  Com ponent  An a l ysi s (see Theil ,  1971) in 
order to  s u mma r i se bot h l i berali zati on i ndi ces in a m eaningful  wa y ;  we  r etain one 
pri nci pal   com ponent   wi t h  an eigenval ue  greater  t han  one.
17
The  m easure of  r eserve r equi r em ents on dom est i c dem and deposi t s i s constr uct ed usi ng 
dat a on  r eserve  r equi r em ent  r ati os.
18  The  i ndex,   graphed  i n  Fi gure 2c  show s  t hat   r eserve 
r equi r em ents on dem and deposi t s increased signi f i cantl y duri ng t he 1987-1989 peri od 
and r em ained r elati vel y hi gh unt i l   t he mi d 1990s,   t o decli ne t o very l ow  l evels i n 1996 
and  1997.  
Empi rical  Res ul t s
The f ol l ow i ng system  of  equat i ons i s esti ma t ed by ma x i mi sing equat i on ( 10)  usi ng t he 
BHHH  algori t hm :
r mt   =  a 0  +  a 1  LI B  t     +  umt ( 11. 1)
hmmt   =  w  01  +  a11  h mmt - 1  +  b11  u m
2
  t - 1+ d11  LI B  t       +  q11  RD  t ( 11. 2)
h11t   =  w  02  +  a22  h11t - 1  +  b22  u 1
2
t -1   + d22  LI B  t     +  q22  RD  t   ( 11. 3)
h22t   =  w  03  +  a33  h22t - 1  +  b33  u 2
2
t -1       + d33  LI B  t     +  q33  RD  t ( 11. 4)
h1m t   =  w  04  +  a44  h 1m t -1  +  b44  u 1t - 1u mt - 1  + d44  LI B  t     +  q44  RD  t   ( 11. 5)
17  See also De me t r i ades and  Lui nt el  ( 1997)  or  Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades ( 1997),   w ho  also advocate usi ng 
( pri nci pal   com ponent )   s u mma r y  m easures  of  f i nanci al  r epression/ l i berali zati on.
18  Luar ens and  Cor doso  ( 1998)  argue t hat   i ndi ces based  onl y  on  t he  r eserve  r equi r em ent  r ati o  and  t hat   do 
not   t ake  i nt o  account   t he  cont i nued  changes  i n  t he  t ax  base  cannot   capture  accurately  t he  r estr i cti veness  of 
r eserve requi r em ents. Thi s argum ent  appl i es to t he Chi l ean case w here authori ties have cont i nuousl y 
changed t he t ax base to cl ose l oophol es and m ake t he cont r ol s m ore restr i cti ve.  In t he case of Ko r ea, 
how ever,   t here have  been no  att em pts t o  change t he  t ax base  and  as such t he  i ndex  we   use  i n  t hi s paper 
r em ains  val i d.20
h2m t   =  w  05  +  a55  h 2m t -1  +  b55  u 2t - 1u mt - 1  + d55  LI B  t     +  q55  RD  t   ( 11. 6)
h12t   =  w  06  +  a66  h12t - 1  +  b66  u 1t - 1u 2t - 1 + d66  LI B  t     +  q66  RD  t   ( 11. 7)
r 1t   =  (   h1m t/   hmmt)πmt   +  u 1t ( 11. 8)
r 2t   =  (   h2m t/   hmmt)πmt   +  u 2t ( 11. 9)
wh e r eL I B  r epresents the pri nci pal  com ponent  of t he fi nanci al l i berali zati on pol i cy
vari ables and RD  i s t he  i ndex  of  r eserve  r equi r em ents on  dom est i c deposi t s.
The esti ma t ed coeff i cients of t hi s m odel  are report ed in Tabl e 3 bel ow ,  wh e r e the 
f i gures in parentheses denot e the m argi nal  signi f i cance levels. Tabl e 3 show s t hat  the 
m odel  perf orm s qui t e w ell  i n expl aini ng t he condi t i onal  vari ances of t he bank and 
f i nanci al  sector  stock  r eturns,   as we l l   as of  t he  ma r ket   r eturns.   Al l   t he  coeff i cients on  t he 
l agged condi t i onal  vari ances and lagged squared residual s are signi f i cantl y di f f erent 
f r om  zero at  the 1%  l evel and are w it hi n a reasonabl e range.  Thi s suggest s that  the 
GARCH ( 1, 1) condi t i onal  vari ance-covari ance m atr i x i s a good descri pt i on of t he 
behavi or of the bank,  fi nanci al and m arket  sector stock returns.  The t able also report s 
r esult s of  t he di agnost i c t ests perf orme d   on t he r esidual s t o provi de an i ndi cati on of  t he 
adequacy of the m odel .  The Lj ung-Box Q  and Q-squared stati sti cs on t he standardi zed 
r esidual s ( t t h u ˆ / ˆ )   and t he squared r esidual s ( t t h u
2 2 ˆ / ˆ ) ,   r especti vel y,   i ndi cate t hat   t here i s 
l i t t l e evidence for r esidual  seri al corr elati on and het eroskedat i cit y for each of t he
condi t i onal   vari ance equat i ons.   We   also carr y  out   di agnost i c t ests as a simp l e i ndi cati on 
f or  t he presence of  m odel   mi sspecif i cati on.   I n part i cular,   we   exam ine t he sign bi as t est 
stati sti c and t he negat i ve and posi t i ve size bi as t est  stati sti cs proposed i n Engl e and Ng  
( 1993);   t he sign bi as t est  i nvest i gat es t he i m pact  of  posi t i ve and negat i ve excess r eturn 
shocks on vol ati l i t y wh i ch we r e not   predicted,  and t he posi t i ve ( negat i ve)  size bi as t est 
f ocuses on t he eff ects of large and sm al l  posi t i ve (negat i ve) excess return shocks not  
predicted by  t he  m odel .   We   f i nd  no  evidence  of  mi sspecif i cati on,   and  alt hough  all   t hese 
di agnost i c tests are m erely i ndi cati ve,  again,  there does seem  to be support  for the 
GARCH  ( 1, 1)  characteri zati on.
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Som e i nt eresti ng observat i ons can be m ade fr om  Tabl e 3. The condi t i onal  m ean
equat i on f or  t he ma r ket  port f ol i o ( equat i on 11. 1)  provi des good evidence t hat   abnorma l  21
profi t s cannot   be ma d e   on t he ma r ket ,   on average,  and t herefore provi des a r easonabl e 
basi s for t he use of t he CA PM  m odel .
20 Ho we v e r ,  we  a l so fi nd t hat  t he fi nanci al
l i berali zati on i ndex (r efl ecti ng dom est i c i. e. i nt erest rate li berali zati on,  and ext ernal
account  i. e. capit al account  li berali zati on) is posi t i ve and si gni f i cantl y di f f erent fr om  
zero ( wi t h a p-val ue equal   t o 0. 03).   Thi s suggest s t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   t hrough 
t hese pol i cy i nst r um ent s,  had a negat i ve eff ect  on t he ( excess)  ma r ket   r eturn,   wh i ch i s 
consi stent wi t h t he vi ew  that  a li berali zed banki ng system  m ay not  necessari l y al l ocate 
i nvest me n t   f unds  t o  proj ects wi t h  t he  hi ghest   r eturns.  
Exami nat i on of t he condi t i onal  vari ance equat i ons gi ves consi stent r esult s. The
esti ma t ed coeff i cients on t he fi nanci al li berali zati on i ndex i n t he condi t i onal  vari ance 
( and covari ance) equat i ons are all  posi t i ve,  i mp l yi ng t hat  i ncreasing fi nanci al
l i berali zati on  over  t hi s peri od  served  t o reduce condi t i onal   vol ati l i t y  and  hence  r i skiness 
i n t he banki ng and fi nanci al sectors, in addi t i on t o t he m arket  sector.  In four of these 
equat i ons t he coeff i cients are signi f i cant at t he 10%  l evel,  and i n t he ot her t wo
equat i ons t he p-val ues t ake values of 0. 187 and 0. 221.  Wi t h regard t o t he est i ma t ed 
coeff i cients on t he reserve requi r em ent index,  the result s are again i nt eresti ng;  all  the 
coeff i cients are negat i ve  and  signi f i cantl y  di f f erent  f r om   zero  at  t he  8%   l evel  except  f or 
t he m arket  equat i on w here the corr espondi ng coeff i cient has a m argi nal  signi f i cance 
l evel of approxi ma t ely 16% .  H ence, thi s suggest s that ,  in general,  the reduct i ons i n 
r eserve r equi r em ents we r e associated wi t h i ncreases i n condi t i onal   vol ati l i t y ( and hence 
r i skiness) of ( especiall y) t he banki ng and fi nanci al sector stock returns.  Thi s m ay
suggest  t hat  r eserve requi r em ents played a prudent i al r ol e, preventi ng l arge shi f t s
t ow ards greater hol di ng of ri sky assets in bank port f ol i os,  t hereby decreasing t hei r  
r i skiness.
21
Tabl e 3 also show s that  the l i berali zati on i ndex and reserve requi r em ents on dem and 
enter signi f i cantl y i n t he condi t i onal  co-vari ances of the banki ng and fi nanci al sector 
port f ol i os wi t h t he ma r ket   port f ol i o i . e.  equat i ons ( 11. 5)  and ( 11. 6)  r especti vel y.These
f i ndi ngs suggest   t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  also aff ected t he  ( non-di versif i able)  ma r ket  
19  A  f ul l   set  of   di agnost i c  result s i s avail able  from  t he  authors  on  request .
20  Fur t hermo r e,  i n  a  preli mi nary  analysi s,  coeff i cients on  l ags  of  t he  excess  r eturns  on  t he  ma r ket   port f ol i o 
we r e  f ound  t o  be  i nsi gni f i cant.
21  Thi s evidence i s also consi stent  wi t h Ge l l es’s ( 1986)  t heoreti cal  f r am ew ork  i n  wh i ch an i ncrease i n  t he 
r equi r ed reserve rati o decreases the rati o of banks'  ri sky assets to t ot al assets (a m easure of bank
r i skiness).22
Tabl e 3:  Condi t i onal   CAPM   wi t h  Mu l t i vari ate GARCH( 1, 1) 
Condi t i onal   Va r i ance  C ovari ance  Ma t rix
Es t i ma t ed Coe f f i cients of  t he  Ma r ket   Por t f ol i o
  a0   a1
Condi t i onal
M ean
- 0. 0019
[ 0. 1447]
0. 0021
[ 0. 0306]
w  01 a11 b11 d11 q11
Condi t i onal
Va r i ance
0. 0005
( 0. 0008)
0. 5192
( 0. 0000)
0. 0908
( 0. 0000)
0. 0028
( 0. 2207)
- 0. 0019
( 0. 1576)
Lj ung- Box  ( 6)  f or  l evels =  7. 333  ( 0. 291)
Lj ung- Box  ( 6)  f or  squares  =  2. 999  ( 0. 809)
Es t i ma t ed Coe f f i cients of  t he  Bank  Condi t i onal   Va r i ance Equat i on
w  02 a22 b22 d 22 q22
Condi t i onal
Va r i ance
0. 0018
( 0. 0000)
0. 4839
( 0. 0000)
0. 1467
( 0. 0000)
0. 0071
( 0. 0321)
- 0. 0110
( 0. 0004)
Lj ung- Box  ( 6)  f or  l evels =  4. 594  ( 0. 597)
Lj ung- Box  (6) for squares  =  0. 319 ( 0. 999)
Es t i ma t ed Coe f f i cients of  t he  Fi nanci al  Sector  Condi t i onal   Va r i ance Equat i on
w  03 a33 b33 d 33 q33
Condi t i onal
Va r i ance
0. 0012
( 0. 0000)
0. 5648
( 0. 0000)
0. 1005
( 0. 0000)
0. 0043
( 0. 1875)
- 0. 0061
( 0. 0091)
Lj ung- Box  ( 6)  f or  l evels =  3. 968  ( 0. 681)
Lj ung- Box  ( 6)  f or  squares  =  0. 747  ( 0. 993)
Es t i ma t ed Coe f f i cients of  t he  Condi t i onal   Covari ance Equat i ons
w  04 a44 b44 d 44 q44
H1 m 0 . 0006
( 0. 0001)
0. 6185
( 0. 0000)
0. 0744
( 0. 0000)
0. 0058
( 0. 0035)
- 0. 0027
( 0. 0388)
w  05 a55 b55 d 55 q55
H2 m 0 . 0006
( 0. 0002)
0. 5986
( 0. 0000)
0. 0827
( 0. 0000)
0. 0046
( 0. 0450)
- 0. 0024
( 0. 0826)
w  06 a66 b66 d 66 q66
H1 2 0 . 0013
( 0. 0000)
0. 5946
( 0. 0000)
0. 1099
( 0. 0000)
0. 0050
( 0. 1070)
- 0. 0061
( 0. 0091)
No t es:  The  esti ma t ed coeff i cients r efer  t o  t he  system  of  equat i ons  ( 11. 1)-  ( 11. 9)  and t he f i gures i n 
parentheses denot e  ma r gi nal   signi f i cance  l evels.
r i sk of t he K orean banki ng and fi nanci al sector.  Thi s is because (i )  ma r ket  ri sk is 
defi ned as t he rati o of the condi t i onal  co-vari ance of the banki ng and fi nanci al sector
port f ol i os wi t h t he ma r ket   port f ol i o ( i . e.  equat i ons ( 11. 5)  and ( 11. 6)  r especti vel y)  t o t he 
condi t i onal  vari ance of t he m arket  port f ol i o (i . e. equat i on 11. 2);  ( i i )  bot h t he23
l i berali zati on i ndex and reserve requi r em ents enter signi f i cantl y i n bot h of t hese
equat i ons.    Furt her evidence on t hi s issue is presented in Fi gures 3a and 3b,  wh i ch 
r especti vel y pl ot  the t i me - v a r yi ng bet as of the banki ng and fi nanci al sectors against  
t i me ,  duri ng t he 1987: 1-1997: 6 peri od.   These fi gures reveal that  wi t h t w o excepti ons
t he banki ng  sector  and  t he  f i nanci al  sector  di d  not   i ncrease duri ng  t he  sam ple peri od.   I f  
anyt hi ng,   t he f i gures show  a steady decli ne i n t he bet as aft er  1988.   The  onl y excepti ons 
are M arch 1994,  wh e n  b e t a increased sli ght l y and becam e highl y vol ati l e, and t he 
peri od  f r om   Febr uary  1997  onw ards  wh e n   t he  bet as f or  t he  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  sector 
start ed t o i ncrease sharpl y.   I t   i s i m port ant  t o not e t hat   duri ng 1997 t here wa s   no change 
i n our pol i cy indi ces and hence the i ncrease in bet as in t he l att er case cannot  be 
att r i but ed to changes i n fi nanci al pol i cies. Inst ead the i ncrease in bank and fi nanci al 
r i skiness mu s t   be att r i but ed t o ‘ bad new s’,   bot h f r om  t he r egion and Ko r ea i t self  – t he 
coll apse of som e of t he l argest  chaebols such as K IA Mo t ors-  w h i ch increased
subst anti all y  t he  vol ati l i t y  of  t he  stock  ma r ket .  
6.   Ana l ysi s and  Co nc l udi ng  Re ma r ks
Ou r  em pir i cal f i ndi ngs suggest  t hat  f i nanci al l i berali zati on reduced banki ng and
f i nanci al  r i sks,  as i mp l i ed by t he signi f i cance of  t he coeff i cients of  t he pol i cy m easures 
i n t he condi t i onal  vari ance and co-vari ance equati ons.  The em pir i cal analysi s also 
suggest s t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   wi t h  t wo   excepti ons,   r educed t he  non-di versif i able
ma r ket   r i sk of  t he  banki ng  and  f i nanci al  sector.     I n  f act,   our  f i ndi ngs  suggest   t hat   ma r ket  
r i sk onl y  began  t o  i ncrease i n  earl y  1997,   wh i ch coinci des  wi t h  ‘ bad  new s’  i n  t he  peri od 
pri or to t he cri sis. Thus,  the econom et r i c fi ndi ngs cont r ast sharpl y w i t h t he ex-post
qual i t ati ve survey f i ndi ngs,   wh i ch dem onst r ate t hat   f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons i n f act  becam e 
exposed t o greater r i sks, t hrough a com bi nat i on of i nadequat e ri sk m anagem ent
system s,  l ack of  expert i se and  w eaknesses i n  prudent i al  r egul ati on.  
The t wo  s e t s of cont r asti ng fi ndi ngs can be reconci l ed, in t hat  the survey fi ndi ngs are 
clearl ye x - post,   havi ng  t he  benefi t   of  hi ndsi ght   wh i ch i ncl uded  an expert   anatom y  of  t he 
cri sis, wh i l e the econom et r i c fi ndi ngs t o a l arge ext ent refl ect the ex-ant e view s of 
ma r ket   part i cipant s,  based on avail able i nforma t i on at   t hat   t i me   as we l l   as t hei r   bel i efs 
concerni ng t he eff ects fi nanci al li berali zati on.  In t hi s sense, the econom et r i c fi ndi ngs 
i ndi cate t hat   f i nanci al  ma r ket   part i cipant s had t r adit i onal   vi ew s,  wh i ch over-em phasi ze24
t he benefi t s of fi nanci al li berali zati on and under-em phasi ze the pi t f all s. A ddi t i onal l y,  
t hey  i ndi cate t hat   i nforma t i on f l ow s f r om  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons t o f i nanci al  ma r ket s we r e 
t oo slow  or  even i naccurate,  as a r esult   of  ( now )  we l l   know n w eaknesses i n corporate 
governance,   bad  account i ng  practi ces and  com plex com pany  l i nkages.       Thus,   i t   i s l i kel y 
t hat  t r adit i onal  bel i efs w oul d have been shat t ered m uch earl i er had ‘bad new s’
concerni ng  poor  r i sk m anagem ent   practi ces hi t   t he  ma r ket s sooner.  
I m port antl y our  surveys also r eveal  t hat   expert   opi ni on – at  l east  i n Kor ea,  t he I MF   and 
t he W orl d Bank – has now  shi f t ed, acknow l edgi ng t hat ,  even though fi nanci al
l i berali zati on m ay i n pri nci pl e off er pot enti al benefi t s (such as greater i nvest me n t
r eturns and opport uni t i es for di versif i cati on),  i t s practi cal i mp l em entati on result s in
greatl y i ncreased ri sks because of w eaknesses in ri sk m anagem ent  and prudent i al
r egul ati on.   A ddi t i onal  informa t i on fr om  our surveys suggest s that  the safety net s that  
have hi stori call y been provi ded by successi ve K orean governm ent s to banks and
i ndust r y m ay w el l  have been responsi bl e for hol di ng back necessary i mp r ovem ent s in 
r i sk m anagem ent   and  prudent i al  r egul ati on.     I mp l i cit   or  expl i cit   safety  net s clearl y  act  as 
di sincenti ves i n m anagi ng r i sks,  r epresenti ng a cert ain t ype of  mo r al  hazard,   al bei t   of  a 
mi l der form t han t he one post ul ated by M cK i nnon and Pi l l  (wh i ch posi t s that  banks 
mi slead invest ors in order to del i berately t ake advantage of safety net s).  Thi s form o f  
mo r al hazard w as cri t i cal in creati ng vul nerabil i t i es in t he banki ng system , i ncl udi ng 
curr ency and  ma t uri t y  mi sm atches,  wh i ch brought   t he  Ko r ean econom y  t o  a stage wh e r e 
even sm all   shocks  coul d  t r i gger  a f ul l -blow n  f i nanci al  cri sis.
A  conj ecture that  em erges fr om  our analysi s is that  t r adit i onal  bel i efs concerni ng
f i nanci al l i berali zati on,  wh i ch over-em phasi ze eff i ciency gains and under-em phasi ze
r i sks,  ma y   we l l   have been r esponsi bl e f or  t he t hesi s’  f ail ure,  by hol di ng back necessary 
i mp r ovem ent s in bot h t he m anagem ent  of fi nanci al ri sks by fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons and 
prudent i al  regul ati on.  Wh i l e thi s m ay, for som e, be i t self  a som ew hat speculati ve 
conj ecture,  i t   i s cert ainl y  one  t hat   opens  up  f r ui t f ul   avenues f or  f urt her  r esearch.
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Appendi x:  A  S u mma r y   of  t he  Ma i n  Fi nanci al   Re f orm s  i n  K orea
1.   Interest  Rat es
Sept em ber 6,  1979: The M onet ary Board abol i shed the exi sti ng m axi mu m i nt erest rate on bank l oans t o m ake i t  
possibl e f or  banks t o alt er  t hei r   i nt erest  r ate on l oans.   Ho we v e r ,   t he Bankers associati on of  Ko r ea,  consi deri ng t hat  
banks t hem sel ves are not  used t o determi ni ng i nt erest rates, decided t o l i nk i nt erest rates on l oans t o t he centr al 
bank’s r ediscount   r ate. 
Sept em ber 6,   1979:  The  m onet ary board abol i shed t he ma x i mu m  i nt erest  r ate on f r ee i nst all me n t   savings deposi t s 
and  t he  ma x i mu m  i nt erest  r ate on  personal   checking  deposi t s.
Ma y   17,   1984:   The  Boa r d  all ow ed  seven  nat i onw i de  c o mme r cial  banks,   l ocal  banks  and  t he  Ko r ea Exchange Bank  t o 
engage  i n  t he  negot i able cert i f i cate of  deposi t   ( CDs )   f r om   1  June.
23 Jul y,  1984:   A  narr ow  band f or  l oan r ates wa s   i nt r oduced so t hat   banks coul d charge di f f erent  r ates accordi ng t o 
t he  credit wo r t hi ness of  t he  borr ow ers.
D ecem ber 5,   1988:  I nt erest  r ate on  l oans  f r om   banks  and  non-bank  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ari es we r e f ul l y  l i berali zed.
D ecem ber 5,   1988:  I nt erest  r ate on t i me   deposi t s of  ma t uri t y greater  t han 2 years at  banks,   post al  savings and credit  
uni ons  we r e l i berali zed.
D ecem ber 5,   1988:  I nt erest  r ate on t i me   and savings deposi t s of  ma t uri t y greater  t han 1 year  at  mu t ual   savings and 
f i nance  com panies we r e l i berali zed.
N ovem ber 21,  1991: Lendi ng rates li berali zed furt her.  Lendi ng rates li berali zed consisted of t hose on bank
overdraft s;  on t he di scount   of  c o mme r cial  bi l l s by banks,   mu t ual   savings and f i nance com panies;  on t he di scount   of 
c o mme r cial  and t r ade bi l l s by i nvest me n t   and f i nance com panies;  on t he purchase of  f i r ms ’   guaranteed papers by 
banks’  t r ust   account s;  and  t hose  on  overdue  l oans  by  all   f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons.
N ovem ber 21,   1991:  The  l i berali zati on  of  deposi t   r ates appl i ed t o  t hose  on  short   t erm,   l arge  denom i nat i on  ma r ket able
i nst r um ent s such as CDs ,   t he  sale of  l arge  denom i nat i on  t r ade bi l l s,  c o mme r cial  papers and  RPs .
N ovem ber 21,  1991: The scope of ini t i al li berali zati on w as ext ended t o cover rates on long-t erm  deposi t s wi t h a 
ma t uri t y of 3 years off ered by banks,  mu t ual  credit  facil i t i es, and credit  uni ons and m ut ual  ti m e deposi t s w it h a 
ma t uri t y  of  2  years and  mo r e  off ered  by  mu t ual   savings  and  f i nance  com panies.
N ovem ber 21,   1991:  The  i ssue r ates of  corporate bonds  wi t h  a ma t uri t y  of  2  years and  mo r e we r e deregulated.
N ovem ber 1,  1993: Al l  l endi ng rates (apart  fr om  t hose fi nanced by t he governm ent  and t he bank of Ko r ea’s 
r ediscount s)  we r e l i berali zed.
N ovem ber 1,   1993:  Ra t es  on  l ong- t erm  deposi t s wi t h  a  ma t uri t y  of  at  l east  t wo   years we r e  com pletely  l i berali zed. 
N ovem ber 1,   1993:   I nt erest  r ate  on  debent ures  and  corporate  bonds  wi t h  a  ma t uri t y  <  2  years we r e  l i berali zed.
D ecem ber 1,   1994:  I nt erest  r ate on  bank  and  non-bank  t i me   deposi t s wi t h  a  ma t uri t y  of  one  year  or  mo r e  but   l ess t han 
2  years we r e l i berali zed.
D ecem ber 1,  1994: Banks w ere permi t t ed to set  fr eely t he i nt erest rates on pol i cy loans fi nanced t hrough t he 
aggregate credit   ceil i ngs  system  wi t hi n  t hei r   r especti ve  pri me   r ates.
Jul y 24,  1995: Int erest rate on pol i cy-based l oans t hrough t he aggregate credit ceil i ngs system  of BOK we r e 
l i berali zed.
N ovem ber 20,   1995:  The  Bank  and  governm ent   f r eed up  t he  r em aini ng  r egul ated i nt erest  r ates on  bank  and  non-bank
t i me   deposi t s wi t h  a  ma t uri t y  l ess t han  six  m ont hs  and  on  t hei r   i nst all me n t   deposi t s wi t h  ma t uri t y  l ess  t han  one  year.
January  19,   1996: The Bank of  Ko r ea l i f t ed t he r estr i cti on on t he size of  t he prem ium  a bank coul d charge over  i t s 
pri me - l endi ng  r ate,  wh i ch had  been ori gi nal l y  i m posed  i n  order  t o  prevent  a sharp  r un-up  i n  bank  l endi ng  r ates i n  t he 
course of  i nt erest  r ate deregul ati on.31
2.   D evelopm ent s i n  M oney Ma r k e t s:
Ma r c h  7 ,  1986: The M onet ary Board l i berali zed the rates on negot i able C D s, secured corporate bonds,  and bank 
debent ures.
Fe br uar y   13,   1987:The  MB   r educed t he  denom i nat i on  of  CDs   f r om   100  mi l l i on  w on  t o  50  mi l l i on  w on.
D ecem ber 5,   1988:   I nt erest  r ate on r epurchase agreem ents,  c o mme r cial  papers of  f ace val ue greater  t han 30 mi l l i on 
and  ma t uri t y  mo r e t han  91  days),   f i nanci al  debent ures and  corporate bonds  we r e f ul l y  l i berali zed.
D ecem ber 5,   1988:   Ne w  c o mme r cial  paper  and  convent i onal   c o mme r cial  paper  we r e me r ged  i nt o  one.
Oc t ober 4,   1989: The Bank and t he governm ent  me r ged t he call  ma r ket s, previousl y segm ent ed int o an i nt er- bank
ma r ket   ma i nl y  f or  banks  and  over  t he  count er  ma r ket   bet w een NBFI s,  wh i ch expanded  t he  size of  t he  m oney  ma r ket  
( call   ma r ket s,  CPs ,   CDs ,   RPs ,   TBs ,   Bankers’  A cceptance).   Af t er  t he  me r ger,   t he  i nt erbank  r ate wa s   f ul l y  l i berali zed. 
Oc t ober 19,   1989:   The  BOK  adjust ed t he ma t uri t y peri od of  CDs   i ssued by banks t o ot her  banki ng  i nst i t ut i ons  f r om  
bet w een 91  days  and  180  days  t o  bet w een 30  days  and  180  days.
N ovem ber 21,   1991:  The  l i berali zati on  of  deposi t   r ates appl i ed t o  t hose  on  short   t erm,   l arge  denom i nat i on  ma r ket able 
i nst r um ent s such as CDs ,   t he  sale of  l arge  denom i nati on  t r ade bi l l s,  c o mme r cial  papers and  RPs .
N ovem ber 21,  1991: The i ssue rates of corporate bonds w i t h a m at uri t y of 2 years and m ore w ere com pletely 
deregul ated.
D ecem ber 19,   1992:  The  Bank  extended  t he  ma x i mu m  ma t uri t i es of  CDs   f r om   180  days  t o  270  days.
N ovem ber 1,   1993:  I nt erest  r ate on f i nanci al  debent ures and t hose corporate bonds wi t h a ma t uri t y of  l ess t han 2 
years we r e l i berali zed.  G overnm ent   and  publ i c bonds  and  MS B   we r e also t o  be  i ssued at  prevail i ng  ma r ket   r ates. 
Sept em ber 3,   1993:The  Bank  l ow ered t he  mi ni mu m  denom i nat i on  of  CDs   f r om   50  mi l l i on  t o  30  mi l l i on.
Jul y 18,   1994:  The  mi ni mu m  ma t uri t i es of  CDs ,   hi gh  denom i nat i on  RPs   we r e short ened f r om   91  days  t o  60  days.  
Jul y 24,   1995:  The  mi ni mu m  ma t uri t i es of  short   t erm  f i nanci al  i nst r um ent s i ncl udi ng CDs ,   hi gh val ue RPs   and hi gh 
val ue  CPs ,   we r e short ened f r om   60  t o  30  days.
3.   Por t f ol i o  Infl ows
D ecem ber 1, 1989:  For eign exchange banks w ere all ow ed t o raise off shore funds by i ssuing foreign curr ency 
denom i nat ed bonds  or  borr ow i ng  f r om   t he  off shore account s of  ot her  dom est i c f oreign  exchange banks.
Ma r c h   1,   1991:  N on-r esident   Ko r ean we r e all ow ed t o sell   f oreign curr encies exceeding US$   50 t housand t o entr ust  
i t s proceeds  t o  devel opm ent   t r ust s wi t h  a  ma t uri t y  of  2  years.  Ef f ecti ve  15  July,   t he  l i mi t   wa s   r aised i n  July  15  t o  100 
US$   100  t housands.
Ef f ecti ve f rom  Ma r c h   8,   1991:  The  governm ent   permi t t ed t he  i ssuance of  f oreign  curr ency denom i nat ed securi t i es t o 
f i nance  t he  i m port   of  product i on  f acil i t i es  and  equi pm ent   f or  wh i ch  no  dom est i c  subst i t ut e  i s avail able.
January  3,   1992:  N on-r esident s we r e all ow ed t o i nvest   i n any dom est i c stocks,   unl ess specif i ed i n som e part i cular 
act.  A 3 % l i mi t  on i nvest me n t  by an i ndi vi dual  foreign and 10%  l i mi t  on t ot al foreign i nvest me n t  are appli ed 
r especti vel y.   I n  case  of  publ i c  ut i l i t i es  and  com panies  i n  i nfant  i ndust r y,   t ot al  f oreign  i nvest me n t   l i mi t   i s set  at  8% .
Sept em ber 1,  1992: Regul ati ons on overseas issue of foreign curr ency denom i nat ed securi t i es w ere greatl y eased.
Type  of  securi t i es ma y   be  i ssued abroad  by  Ko r ean r esident s we r e expanded  t o  i ncl ude  negot i able CDs   and  CPs .
Sept em ber 1,  1992: Funds raised by t he i ssue of foreign curr ency denom i nat ed securi t i es w ere permi t t ed to be 
deposi t ed eit her  i n  a r esident   account   or  an account   wi t h  overseas branch of  a dom est i c exchange bank.
Fe b  1,   1993:  Ov e r seas branches of  dom est i c banks we r e i n pri nci pl e prohi bi t ed f r om  supplyi ng l oans t o r esident s of 
Ko r ea.  But   f r om   t he  above  dat e,  t he  governm ent   permi t t ed t hem   t o  extend  l oans  t o  r esident s of  Ko r ea engaged  i n  t he 
t r ading  of  t he  com m odi t y  f ut ures or  f i nanci al  f ut ures.32
Apr i l   1,   1993:  The  governm ent   changed t he system  wh e r eby permi ssion has t o be obt ained f r om  f oreign curr ency 
denom i nat ed deposi t s coul d be i ssued t o a r eport i ng system .  I nst ead of  obt aini ng permi ssion before issuing foreign 
curr ency denom i nat ed securi t i es,  now   i t   onl y  needed t o  be  r eport ed.
Apr i l   1, 1993:Previousl y r estr i cted t o enterpri ses t hat   had r ecorded a net   profi t s i n each of  previous 3 years,  i ssuers 
we r e wi dened  t o  i ncl ude  t hose  t hat   had  r ecorded  a net   profi t   on  an accum ulati ve  basi s over  t he  preceding  3  years.
Jul y 1,   1994:The governm ent   part i all y opened t he dom est i c bond ma r ket   all ow i ng non-r esident s t o  purchase non-
guaranteed convert i bl e bonds i ssues by SM Es  subj ect  t o 30%  l i mi t   on t ot al  f oreign i nvest me n t   per  i ssue and a 5%  
l i mi t   per  i ssue on  i nvest me n t   by  i ndi vi dual   f i r ms .
D ecem ber 1,   1994:  The  ceil i ng on overall   f oreign i nvest me n t   i n a l i sted com pany’s out standi ng stocks we r e r aised 
f r om   10%   t o  12% .
Ma y   3,   1995:  Fi r ms   we r e permi t t ed t o  under t ake f oreign borr ow i ngs di r ectl y f or  t he r edem pti on of  f oreign debt s on 
onerous  t erm  f or  t he  i m port   f acil i t i es wh e r e t he  f i r ms   we r e sm all   and  me d i um   sized m anufactures.
June  20,   1995:  The  governm ent   permi t t ed t he  overseas i ssuance of  exchangeable bonds.
Jul y 1,   1995:  The  general  ceil i ng  on  t ot al  f oreign  i nvest me n t   i n  a l i sted com pany’s out standi ng  stock  wa s   r aised f r om  
12%   t o  15%   and  t hat   f or  t hose  of  publ i c  corporati ons  f r om   8%   t o  10% .
Apr i l   1,   1996:  The  aggregate ceil i ng wa s   r aised f r om  15%  t o 18%  of  t he out standi ng stocks i ssued by a l i sted f i r m 
and fr om  10%  t o 12%  for those i ssued by publ i c corporati on.  The ceil i ng on hol di ng of indi vi dual  invest ors w as 
r aised f r om   3%   t o  4%   of  a f i r m’ s out standi ng  stocks.
Ma y   1,   1996:N on-r esident s we r e all ow ed  t o  purchase and  t r ade bonds  wi t h  wa r r ants.
Ma y   3,   1996:N on-r esident s we r e all ow ed  t o  t r ade stock  i ndex  f ut ures on  t he  KSE.
Oc t ober 1,  1996: The general ceil i ng w as raised again t o 20%  for a fi r m  and 15%  for a publ i c corporati on.  The 
i ndi vi dual   ceil i ng  wa s   at  t he  sam e t i me   i ncreased t o  5% .
Oc t ober 1,  1996: The governm ent  di sm antl ed m ost r estr i cti ons on di r ect f oreign borr ow i ngs,  enabli ng non-
m anufacturi ng  SM Es  t o  r eceive  l oans  f r om   abroad  f or  t he  i m port   of  product i on  f acil i t i es.
Ma y   1,   1997:  The  l i mi t   on  f oreign  ow nership  of  Ko r ean equi t i es wa s   r aised t o  23% .
June  1,   1997:Foreign  i nvest ors we r e granted access t o  non-guaranteed bonds  of  SM Es  and  of  congl om erates.
4.   R eserve Re qui rem ents on  De ma nd   D eposi t s
Ef f ecti ve N ovem ber 23,   1987:  The  M onet ary  Boa r d  r aised t he  mi ni mu m  r eserve  r equi r em ent  f r om   4. 5%   t o  7. 0% .
Apr i l   20,   1989:  A  ma r gi nal   r eserve  r equi r em ent  r ati o  of  30%   on  t he  average  i ncrem ent  of  dem and  deposi t s and  t i me  
and  saving  deposi t s has  been i m posed.   The  ma r gi nal   r eserve  r equi r em ents we r e abol i shed i n  Febr uary  1990.
15 Fe br uar y   1990:    The  Bank r aised r eserve r equi r em ent  r ati os on t i me   deposi t s,  i nst alme n t   savings deposi t s wi t h 
ma t uri t y of 2 years or mo r e and H ousehol d i nst alme n t  saving deposi t  fr om  7. 0%  t o 8. 0% .  On  a l l  ot her deposi t s, 
r eserve  r equi r em ent  r ati o  i ncreased f r om   10%   t o  11. 5% .
February  8,   1991:   The  Bank  i nt r oduced  r eserve  r equi r em ents against   mu t ual   i nst alme n t   deposi t s. 
Apr i l   23,   1996:   The  r eserve r equi r em ent  on t i me   and savings deposi t s of  mo r e t han 2 years wa s   brought   dow n f r om  
8%   t o  6% .
Apr i l   23,   1996:  The  r eserve  r equi r em ent  on  checking  deposi t s,  pass book  deposi t s,  saving  deposi t s,  Ti me   and  saving 
deposi t s wi t h  ma t uri t y  of  l ess t han  t wo   years wa s   l ow ered  f r om   11. 5%   t o  9. 0% .
N ovem ber 8,   1996:  The  r eserve r equi r em ent  on t i me   and savings deposi t s of  mo r e t han 2 years wa s   brought   dow n 
f r om   6%   t o  4% .
N ovem ber 8,   1996:  The  r eserve r equi r em ent  on checking deposi t s,  pass book deposi t s,  saving deposi t s,  Ti me   and 
saving  deposi t s wi t h  ma t uri t y  of  l ess t han  t wo   years wa s   l ow ered  f r om   9. 0%   t o  7. 0% .